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Private Standards, Small Farmers and Donor Policy: 
EUREPGAP in Kenya
John Humphrey 
Summary
Food safety has moved up the policy agenda in industrialised countries in recent
years. Governments have tightened both product and process standards, and
businesses have had to respond to ever more stringent public food safety 
standards and the need to maintain consumer confidence. Private voluntary 
standards developed by groups of companies are one response to this challenge.
Complying with process-based standards and certification at the farm level has
become a market access condition for access for some products. Failure to meet
these challenges will undermine rural development strategies predicated on
expanding agricultural production and introducing high-value products. An analysis
of the EUREPGAP standard for horticulture links this standard to the development
of European Union food safety regulations. It is also bound up with the 
management of horticultural value chains that link together and coordinate the
activities of producers, exporters, importers and retailers. As a pre-farm gate 
standard, EUREPGAP creates new challenges not only for farmers, but also for
the exporters that play a key role in the horticultural value chains supplying
European supermarkets. When some European supermarkets began to insist that
Kenyan suppliers be certified, the potential impact on small farmers in Kenya was
recognised by numerous development agencies. However, to the extent that their
responses focused directly on the problems of small farmers rather than on 
certification as a value chain coordination issue, some of their interventions were
ineffective. The future challenge for donors will be both to understand better how
the global food business is organised into value chains that link together 
dispersed economic agents, and to devise policies and programmes that 
recognise the possible trade-offs between business vitality and poverty reduction
and identify the roles and responsibilities of public and private actors in ways that
allow these trade-offs to be overcome.
Keywords: horticulture; trade; private standards; globalisation; small farmers.
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1 Introduction
Food safety has moved up the agenda in all industrialised countries in recent
years, partly as a result of a series of food scandals: dioxins, BSE (‘mad cow’
disease), pesticide residues, cyclospora contamination in raspberries, salmonella
in eggs, contamination of dairy products, etc. These have led to a crisis in 
consumer confidence that both governments and food companies (producers,
manufacturers and retailers) have struggled to address (Jaffee 2005; Caswell and
Hooker 1996). In response to these food safety scares, a new global food safety
regime has developed. 
Global, or international, standards are not new. Compliance with the food safety
standards of importing countries has been an issue for food exporters since the
nineteenth century. However, this new regime can be distinguished from its 
forebears by three novelties. First, this new regime is characterised by a shift
away from product quality/safety controls in favour of controls on the processes
involved in food production and processing. Risk-based quality and safety 
assurance schemes such as the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) approach and the ISO 9000 quality systems are being applied by food
chain operators all over the world. Second, the new food safety regime is 
extending controls to primary agricultural activities, imposing process standards
right down to the field or to the aquaculture pond. Third, the new regime 
increasingly involves both public and private actors as standards setters and
enforcers. Whereas governments once claimed all responsibility for food safety in
its territory, at present food safety assurance is sought by a complex interplay
between public and private actors. 
This poses new challenges both for farmers and for actors (processors and
exporters) downstream in the value chain. Securing and demonstrating food 
safety becomes an issue for the whole of the food value chain and for the 
regulatory processes that contribute to its governance – both public and private.
The new approach not only implies that controls operate at different points along
the chain, but also that food safety depends upon the integrity of standards being
maintained as products move between companies and countries in their journey
from farm to fork. 
The increasing prevalence of these standards and the way that they are 
implemented has direct consequences for food production systems in developing
countries. First, they have become a condition for access to export markets. Both
public and private standards (see below) have become conditions for access to
important markets. Public standards have long been criticised for the demands
they place on developing country producers and governments. Private standards
have now become important enough for the WTO’s SPS Committee to discuss
whether or not such standards fall within the scope of the SPS agreement (WTO
2007). The report of the Commission for Africa (2005) also highlighted the 
importance of standards as barriers to trade and potential obstacles to Africa’s
food exports. Second, even if some (or many) developing countries are able to
meet the emerging food standards, one can expect profound distributional 
consequences from the growth of international food standards. There are widely
held concerns about the new standards regime impact on small farmers because
IDS WORKING PAPER 308
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of the capital costs of compliance, increased bureaucracy and the costs of 
certification itself. Might small farmers be squeezed out of global markets by, in
particular, the new wave of private standards? Similarly, some countries might be
better able to adjust to the new demands imposed by developed countries. Once
again, the report of the Commission for Africa raised the concern that African
countries would lose out to competitors from regions such as Latin America if they
were not able to adapt to the new standards regime (Commission for Africa 2005:
265–6). 
The efficacy of the responses by both public and private actors in developing
countries to these challenges will determine which producers and which countries
will be able to gain access to developed country markets, and which will become
increasingly marginalised. Failure to meet these challenges will undermine rural
development strategies that have been predicated on expanding agricultural 
production, introducing high-value products and tapping into the fast-expanding
sectors of global trade. While the potential for diversification is clear, realising it
will require effective answers to the challenges posed by the emerging global
standards regime. 
Food standards are, then, a development issue that concerns both national 
governments and international development agencies. Policy responses are called
for and frequently offered. However, the nature of the new challenges posed by
the new food safety regime and philosophy are not well understood. Furthermore,
an effective response to these challenges requires cooperation between national
governments and development agencies on the one hand, and private sector
actors on the other. Making food value chains compliant with the new food safety
regime involves governments working with the private sector actors, both large
and small, that are responsible for food production. This report focuses on the
challenges and on the interactions between state and private sector involved in
meeting them.
It focuses particularly on EUREPGAP in Kenya. The introduction of the 
EUREPGAP private voluntary standard for export horticulture was particularly
important for Kenya. Horticultural exports to Europe have been a major contributor
to the growth of the rural economy in Kenya since the 1980s, but EUREPGAP
created major new challenges, particularly for smallholder horticulture. As a 
pre-farmgate, process standard, it required substantial changes in farming 
methods and greatly increased control over farming practices. These concerns
increased because of the January 2005 deadline for EUREPGAP compliance,
leading to a flurry of initiatives to support small farmer compliance with the new
standard. This case study focuses on these initiatives, highlighting both the 
profound ways in which EUREPGAP affects small farmers and the extent to which
these initiatives were based on a good understanding of both the challenges 
created and the role of the public sector in meeting them.
1.1 Outline and methods
In order to explore these issues, this Working Paper addresses two key areas.
First, it examines the development of private standards. The sequence of this
analysis moves from the general tendencies in global food safety standards to the
impact of one important standard, EUREPGAP, at farm level in Kenya. It starts, in
Section 2, by providing an overview of trends in global food standards. This is 
followed in Section 3 by an analysis of the development of private voluntary 
standards in the food industry, which analyses the motivations that lead groups of
firms to develop food safety standards and links this process to developments in
public food safety regulations. In Section 4, the impact of the introduction of
EUREPGAP in Kenya, and in particular its consequences for the organisation of
production at farm level, are analysed. 
Sections 2–4 identify the challenges posed for small farmers by the introduction of
EUREPGAP, but situate this challenge firmly in the context of a horticultural export
value chain in which European retailers and importers on the one hand, and
Kenyan exporters on the other, operate a complex and integrated food system
that is designed to manage (or contain) a range of risks. These risks not only
relate to food safety, but also to the reputations and brand images of food 
retailers. 
The second part of the paper focuses on the response of donors to the apparent
threat that EUREPGAP posed to small farmers in Kenya. In Section 5, the 
reasons why donors felt that they had to intervene are outlined, and the broad
range of interventions they undertook are analysed. This is followed in Section 6
by an evaluation of donor interventions and the logic that underlay them. It is
argued that failures to understand how both the characteristics and organisational
implications of EUREPGAP itself, and the way in which the export horticulture
sector was organised into a complex and highly coordinated value chain in which
exporters played a pivotal role meant that donor interventions were less effective
than they might have been. 
The research leading to this paper is based predominantly on in-depth interviews
with key informants. Some of these were conducted in Germany and the UK, but
most were carried out in Kenya. For the exporters, interviews were conducted with
13 managers from six different companies. Nine people connected with donor 
programmes were interviewed. Six people working as or with service providers
were also interviewed. Ten farmers working with one of the independent PMOs
were also interviewed. This interview material was complemented by the 
extensive documentation available on the internet.1
2 The changing nature of food 
standards
One driver of the increasing prevalence and stringency of standards in developed
countries in recent years has undoubtedly been increasing consumer fears about
food and health following a string of well-publicised food scares and the 
consequent efforts of both governments and the food industry to allay consumer
concerns. A non-exhaustive list of these scares is shown in Table 2.1. 
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1 See Appendix 1 for more details.
Table 2.1 Examples of major food safety ‘events’ in industrialised
countries
Source: Jaffee (2005: 16).
Food scares not only endanger consumers but also threaten to undermine 
consumer confidence in the economically and politically important food industries.
Food safety authorities have responded by introducing and strengthening controls
over the processes by which food is grown, processed and distributed. This has
led to a broader change in how standards are implemented, what they aim to
achieve, who develops them and how they are enforced. 
The number and complexity of standards relating to food has increased 
remarkably. A broad range of overlapping standards have originated from private
companies, business organisations, regional governments, national governments
and supra-national organisations.2 There is also a proliferation of bodies, both
public and private, that are concerned with generating, requiring, conforming to
and checking food safety standards.
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2 See, for example, the analysis of food standards in European countries produced by the European 
Union Directorate General Joint Research Centre (EU/DG Joint Research Centre 2005: 27–31).
Year Event Country
1987/1988 Beef hormone scare Italy/EU
1988 Poultry salmonellaoutbreak/scandal UK
1989 Growth regulator (alar) scarefor apples United States
1993 E. coli outbreak in fast-foodhamburgers United States
1996 BSE links to human brain disease UK
1996/1997 Microbiological contamination,berries United States, Canada
1995–1997 Avian flu spreads to humans
Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, Taiwan
Province of China
1999 Dioxins in animal feed Belgium
2000 Large-scale food poisoning,dairy Japan
2001 Contaminated olive oil Spain
2.1 New tendencies in public standards
Four clear trends in the global food standards have particular relevance for small
farmers in horticulture.
1 Expansion of the range of issues addressed by standards and tightening up 
on permitted limits. In the case of the European Union, increasing awareness 
of food-related health risks has led to a tightening-up of product standards: 
the specifications that food reaching the consumer has to meet. Controls on 
pesticide residues have been tightened up, as well as limits for residues of 
veterinary drugs and concern with microbiological contamination such as 
salmonella and vibrio cholera (Manarungsan et al. 2004: 14–19). A similar 
tightening of controls has been seen in other countries. According to Jaffee 
(2005: 21), ‘A parallel tightening of pesticide-related regulations has occurred 
in the United States’, and as in Europe, food safety legislation has addressed 
new concerns such as heavy metal contamination and mycotoxins.
2 There has been a shift from controls based on inspection to controls based 
on risk assessment in order to tackle food safety problems at source. HACCP
is the key element in this approach. Busch et al. define this succinctly in the 
following terms: ‘HACCP principles stress identifying Critical Control Points 
(CCPs) where hazards are likely to occur in a processing chain, establishing 
critical limits for each CCP, establishing preventive measures to be taken to 
keep hazards within critical limits at each CCP, record keeping, and continued
validation and updating of the HACCP system’ (Busch et al. 2005: 18). 
Process controls provide a more efficient way of providing assurances that 
products meet the standards expected. According to Unnevehr, ‘There is 
growing adoption in the food industry of management practices that focus on 
prevention and control of food safety hazards. Many hazards are expensive to
test for and may enter food products at several points in the production 
process. Therefore, documented production practices, that are verified to 
prevent and control hazards, are becoming accepted as the most cost-
effective means of reducing food safety hazards. While testing and verification
are essential for establishing good process controls, testing can never be 
practical as the only means of monitoring safety’ (Unnevehr 2000: 235).
3 The increasing importance of traceability is directly linked to the development 
of process controls as a means of achieving standards. Traceability is an 
important element of a food safety system in its own right. It allows both the 
tracing back of problems to their source, and consequently the chance of 
eliminating them there, and also traceability forwards from the source so that 
other potentially dangerous foods can be taken off the market. But, with the 
increasing importance of risk-based process standards, traceability acquires a
new role in the integrity of the food safety system. If food safety is dependent 
upon controls over processes along the food chain, then system integrity 
depends upon assurances that only food from certified establishments and 
processes enters the chain. Traceability is essential for this. As process 
controls are extended back to the farm level, so traceability has to be 
established from the farm. 
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4 The extension of process-based controls to the farm. Much of the focus of 
risk-based food safety controls has, hitherto, been focused on food 
processing. Process-based food safety standards and regulations applied at 
the farm level have been well-established for the meat industry. They are 
increasingly evident in the seafood industry, where government regulation of 
the shrimp industry in countries such as Thailand also involves regular 
inspections and a code of conduct for shrimp farming. We will show below 
that process standards are also being applied at farm level. 
We will argue later that trends in public standards are important drivers of the
rapid evolution of private standards in the food industry.
2.2 The changing nature of EU standards
The tendencies outlined in the previous section and their consequences for food
safety and food standards are clearly evident in recent evolution of food safety
legislation in the European Union, where new measures have been introduced in
the past few years. Some of these measures relate to product standards. One of
the most important changes in product standards was EU directive 42/2000/EC
on Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) for active ingredient/commodity com-
binations, which came into force in July 2001 as part of the EU pesticide 
regulation harmonisation programme. This directive has had a substantial impact
on the horticulture sector. In the case of shrimp, the use of all nitrofurans, with the
exception of furazolidone, was banned in the EU in 1993, and furazolidone
banned two years later. This has caused repeated problems for exporting 
countries ever since (Kennedy 2004). 
More importantly, new regulations have introduced new process standards. The
European Commission’s White Paper on food safety, published in 2000, led to a
broad range of legislation on both product and process standards. From 2002 to
2005, new EU legislation on food addressed issues such as food and feed 
controls, hygiene and animal health.3 The Commission has been at pains to
emphasise that much of this legislation merely harmonises previous legislation
across the EU, and the guidance notes on food hygiene and official food controls,
for example, state categorically the key controls were already in force before
January 2006 (European Commission 2006: section 3). Nevertheless, these 
regulations do incorporate a new and distinct EU food standards philosophy.
2.2.1 EU standards philosophy
The regulations setting up the European Food Safety Authority (CEC 2002) 
illustrate the change in the EU’s approach to food safety. The preamble to the
regulation identifies four key principles:
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3 Consolidated text of EU legislation with all the amendments, can be found at http://europa.eu.int/
eur-lex/en/consleg/index.html. For guidance documents on legislation, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/food/foodlaw/guidance/index_en.htm.
1 Food safety is to be ensured by focusing on the food value chain as a whole: 
‘In order to ensure the safety of food, it is necessary to consider all aspects of
the food production chain as a continuum from and including primary 
production and production of animal feed up to and including sale or supply of
food to the consumer because each element may have a potential impact on 
food safety’ (paragraph 12). A later summary of import conditions for seafood 
state this in simpler language: ‘the food law of the European Union 
implements the principle of quality management and process-oriented 
controls throughout the food chain – from the fishing vessel or aquaculture 
farm to the consumer’s table. Spot checks on the end product alone would 
not provide the same level of safety, quality and transparency to the 
consumer’ (European Commission n.d.: 1).
2 Food safety is based upon the principle of containing risk. Elimination or 
avoidance of risks to health requires risk assessment, risk management and 
risk communication (paragraph 17). In other words, food safety is to be 
achieved through identification and control of risk, which means a process 
control approach, rather than a testing approach. The HACCP (Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point) methodology is central to this.
3 Traceability. Control of risk and rectification of problems requires traceability. 
This is secured through identification of suppliers and customers for all 
products incorporated into food or feed (paragraph 29). This in turn requires 
record-keeping and labelling (article 18, paragraphs 1 and 2), so that 
information can be supplied to the authorities on demand. The EU insists on 
having traceability in place: a paper trail through which food (components) 
can be traced back to the farm/field/pond from which they originated.
4 Private sector responsibility. Paragraph 30 of the preamble to the General 
Food Law legislation states that: ‘A food business operator is best placed to 
devise a safe system for supplying food and ensuring that the food it supplies 
is safe; thus, it should have primary legal responsibility for ensuring food 
safety’ (CEC 2002: L31/3). However, the precise impact of this legislation 
varies from country to country. The Guidance Principles on the General Food 
Law note that the precise ways in which this liability is implemented in 
particular EU countries depends upon national legal orders: ‘Though the 
requirement laid down in Article 17 (1) is directly applicable from 1 January 
2005, the liability of food business operators should flow in practice from the 
breach of a specific food law requirement (and from the rules for civil or 
criminal liability which can be found in the national legal order of each 
Member state). The liability proceedings will not be based on Article 17 but on
a legal basis to be found in the national legal order and in the specific 
infringed legislation (CEC 2004: 6). In the UK, the Food Safety Act changed 
this liability. Prior to the 1990 Act, ‘food legislation contained the so-called 
“warranty” defence. A person accused of an offence would escape conviction 
if he could prove that, when he bought the product, he obtained a written 
warranty from his supplier that the product could be lawfully sold or dealt with;
that there was no reason to believe, when the offence was committed, that 
the true position was otherwise, and that the product was in the same state 
as when he bought it’ (Humber Authorities Food Liaison Group n.d.: 4–5). The
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1990 Act put food business operators under ‘strict liability’ to sell safe food, 
but there is a statutory defence (i.e. one which is specified in the legislation) 
of due diligence. If all reasonable precautions are taken, the strict liability 
does not apply. In many European countries a positive case of negligence 
has to be proved. So, food business operators in countries which have not 
implemented strict liability are not subject to the same level of risk as in 
countries that have.4
This philosophy is incorporated into EU directives that have created domestic 
regulatory systems in Member states and ensured the EU-wide implementation
through mandatory registration of food processing establishments, and 
subsequently by making the implementation of HACCP-based controls a pre-
condition for registration. Only primary producers are excluded from these 
requirements. These process controls are complemented by an inspection system
that uses sampling to check on the effectiveness of both the individual operators
and the food and feed chain as a whole (CEC 2002). These checks are the
responsibility of the competent authority in each country. The EU expects food
exporting countries to implement quality systems that create the same level of
confidence in the quality of their exported food as might be expected from food
produced within the EU.
These measures, focused directly on the feed and food chain, are accompanied
by further controls to ensure that harmful substances or agents cannot enter into
the food chain:
l Standards for the quality of water sources, surrounding surface waters and 
effluents, and a monitoring system for this. 
l A system for the approval and registration of agro-chemicals such as 
fertilisers and pesticides and animal antibiotics. 
l Monitoring and control of the occurrence of contagious diseases, both 
veterinary and human through the public health system. 
In other words, food safety is based not only on controls over food production, but
also the environment in which food production takes place. 
2.3 The growth of global standard setting regimes
Nils Brunsson has defined standards as ‘rules outside organisations’, and
Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000) argue that such rules are now omnipresent in the
modern world:
There are plenty of people in the modern world who know what is best for
everyone else. Self appointed experts and pressure groups abound, all with
their own good causes and all trying to convince states, corporations, and
individuals how much better off they would be, if only they would follow 
certain specific rules of behaviour ... the pundits of the Worldwide Fund for
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4 I am grateful to Nina Rodmann of the University of Cologne for clarifying this point.
Nature (WWF), the International Women’s Rights Watch, the International
Standards Organization (ISO), the International Football Association (FIFA),
the International Labour Office (ILO), OECD and many more cannot perhaps
force us to follow the rules, but they still often managed to get us to do so.
Even powerful organizations like states and large corporations go by rules
that others have provided about how to organize, what policies to pursue,
what kind of services to offer, or how to design their products.
(Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000: 1)
There are many rules, but some are more important than others. Because food
safety affects both citizen welfare and international trade, it has been a matter for
government and inter-governmental negotiation since the nineteenth century. As a
result, food safety standards are regulated by agreements about what can be 
formulated in the context of the WTO, how rules are to be enforced, how lab-
oratories are to be regulated, etc. These rules not only regulate the food safety
system within the context of inter-governmental agreements, but also specify how
the integrity of the global food standards system is maintained. 
2.3.1 The role of the Codex Alimentarius
A good place to start the examination of the global food standards system is the
work of the Codex Alimentarius Committee (CAC). The CAC is at the centre of the
system, promulgating meta-standards and providing the basis for inter-
governmental negotiations around standards.
The Codex Alimentarius has different types of rules, as shown in Table 2.2.
Although the Codex is primarily concerned with government regulations, the types
of rules it applies are also relevant to private voluntary standards, and many of the
Codex principles are incorporated into private voluntary standards. The first row in
the table refers to rules about products. For example, the Codex Alimentarius 
contains a rule about veterinary drugs in meat: the CAC provides a table which
recommends that the maximum residue level for the veterinary drug, Abamectin,
in the kidney tissue of cattle is 50 micrograms per kilogram (Codex Alimentarius
Commission 2006). This product standard can also be thought of as an outcome
standard. The output of a food quality and safety system should result in a residue
of this particular veterinary drug no greater than the recommended limit. Note that
this role has no direct legal force. It is a recommendation aimed primarily at 
governments to guide their own rule-making. Its force actually comes from a 
different set of rules, discussed below. National governments can make rules 
(develop standards) that differ from these recommendations, but these are open
to challenge within the SPS framework and should be justified by science-based
concerns. Note also, that within this category of rules, the Codex Alimentarius
Commission’s own summary of its rules includes rules (or recommendations)
about analysis and sampling. In other words, as well as defining rules about 
product characteristics, it also suggests ways in which these rules should be
implemented through testing procedures.
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Table 2.2 Three types of rules in the Codex Alimentarius
1 Codex standards.
a Referring to specific commodities. Standards for specific products.
b Referring to ranges of commodities. Standards for ranges of 
products.
c Codex methods of analysis and sampling.
2 Codex codes of practice for production, processing, manufacturing, 
transport and storage.
a For individual foods.
b For groups of foods.
c General principles for all products, such as the Codex General 
Principles of Food Hygiene.
3 Codex guidelines.
a Principles that set out policy in key areas.
b Guidelines for the interpretation of these principles or for the 
interpretation of other Codex standards.
c Interpretative Codex guidelines for labelling and claims about 
food.
d Guidelines for interpreting Codex principles for food import and 
export inspection and certification, etc.
Source: Codex Alimentarius Commission (1997a: 10–11).
Within this first group of rules, the Codex also contains non-mandatory product
standards that are more concerned with establishing common reference points.
The issue here is not whether one reference point is better than another, but that
everyone uses the same one in order to facilitate transactions, interfaces between
products, etc. The CAC, for example, has a standard for asparagus that not only
defines minimum requirements, but also distinguishes between three grades of
asparagus (Codex Alimentarius Commission 2005). The importance of this type of
standard has been analysed by David (1995).
The second line of the table refers to Codex codes of practice for production, 
processing, manufacturing, transport and storage. These are the meta-standards
that are incorporated into specific standards. These refer to processes – the
means by which products are produced, handled and processed on their way to
the consumer. Process controls have three main objectives. First, as was noted
above, process standards provide a means of controlling quality and safety in a
way that is more cost-effective than testing (Unnevehr 2000: 235).
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Second, process standards are a means of controlling for food safety hazards that
are either impossible or very difficult to detect. Busch et al. (2005: 15) cite the
cases of a hepatitis A outbreak caused by green onions in the United States in
2003 and microbiological contamination in general. There is no reliable test for
hepatitis A in green onions and microbiological contamination is hard to detect.
The response is to implement food safety and hygiene regulations at source to
reduce the risk of contamination. 
Third, process standards allow the monitoring and control of characteristics that
are extrinsic to the product; these have no physical presence in the product, and
are therefore not revealed by inspection. As Liddell and Bailey argue for the case
of standards in the pork industry, ‘Extrinsic qualities do not affect either food 
safety or the intrinsic qualities of the meat product but may still affect the value of
the product. Extrinsic qualities could include assurances about animal welfare,
environmental preservation, or other inputs or absence of inputs used to produce
the meat product’ (Liddle and Bailey 2001:  288). Process standards are 
indispensable in such cases because the characteristics do not show up in the
final product.
The Codex codes of practice for manufacturing, processing, etc., referred to in
Table 2.2 are frequently expressed in guidelines that have been drawn from best
practice on food safety, codified by the CAC and incorporated into many 
standards. These meta-standards include Good Agricultural Practice and Good
Manufacturing Practice, which are then adopted by both private standard setters
and governments (Busch et al. 2005: 16; Henson 2006: 11). 
The third group of Codex guidelines listed in Table 2.2 are more general, setting
out principles and providing guidelines for interpreting principles. In effect, these
are rules that specify the ways in which food safety rules are formulated and
implemented. The following is taken from the CAC’s ‘Guidelines for The Design,
Operation, Assessment and Accreditation of Food Import and Export Inspection
and Certification Systems’:
Controls on imported food and domestically produced foods should be
designed to achieve the same level of protection. The importing country
should avoid the unnecessary repetition of controls where these have been
already validly carried out by the exporting country.
(Codex Alimentarius Commission 1997b: Section 5, Paragraph 11)
These recommendations have particular force because the CAC has a special
status within the WTO SPS system as the body that sets international standards
for food safety. Governments are expected to comply with its recommendations
and justify deviations from them. While the CAC’s recommendations are primarily
addressed to governments, private standards for food safety are also constructed
around these same principles. There are at least three reasons for this. First,
these guidelines represent best practice, and private firms often participate in their
formulation through their membership of bodies such as the ISO or through their
participation in the formulation of national policies that are taken by their 
governments to the CAC. Second, private voluntary standards for food safety, as
will be argued further below, are often responses to government regulations and
are aimed at the same outcome. Third, by building on the framework of public
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standards, private standards are able to reduce the cost of standards formulation
and enforcement. Private standards can use the facilities provided by the public
infrastructures for standards: for example recognition of laboratories or rules 
regulating Certification Bodies.
The standards system for food safety is multi-layered. Different and sometimes
competing bodies create standards, while the formulation and implementation of
standards are themselves regulated (or standardised) by another level of 
standards. This complexity can best be understood through the analysis of 
standards as a rules system.
2.3.2 The global food safety system and its layers of rules
If the global food safety system is a set of rules, then it can be analysed in terms
of the questions set out in Table 2.3. This distinguishes between the different
stages in the formulation and application of rules relating to food safety (in the left
column), who implements these processes, and rules that regulate how the four
rule operations are implemented.
Table 2.3 The rules operating in the global standard system
The introduction and operationalisation of a standard requires the formulation of a
rule, a decision by an organisation to adopt it (i.e. to require that it be followed by
another organisation), the implementation of the rule by that other organisation,
with monitoring and enforcement of the rule, and procedures to establish 
equivalence. At each stage, there are procedures to guarantee the integrity of the
rules system. These different steps may be taken by many different organisations.
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Rule 
operations
Who decides Rules about rules: integrity
Formulation Many different bodies can formu-
late rules, public and private,
national and international.
There are rules about what 
constitutes legitimate rules.
Adoption Adoption usually requires the
power to insist that others conform
to particular rules. This can be
legal power exercised by states,
or market power exercised by
firms or groups of firms.
Some bodies, particularly national
governments, face constraints
about the types of rules they can
adopt.
Implementation,
monitoring and
enforcement
Some entity is expected to follow
the rules adopted by others. How
is this checked and enforced?
How will compliance with rules be
monitored and enforced?
How are the monitoring and
enforcement of the rules them-
selves monitored and enforced?
Equivalence How is the equivalence of different
standards established?
What are the rules for ensuring
that system equivalence is fairly
and speedily recognised?
A standard, such as the EUREPGAP standard may be developed by a technical
committee, adopted by some retailers, implemented by farmers and exporters,
monitored by certification bodies (who are themselves monitored by accreditation
bodies). The equivalence of other standards to EUREPGAP is decided through
procedures involving EUREPGAP itself, its members and an Accreditation Body
(Sheehan 2007). The sequence of standards definition and application is as 
follows:
1 Formulation. Transnational organisations play a particularly important role in 
the formulation of standards and guidelines for standards. The guidelines 
produced by these international bodies do not prevent other organisations 
from creating food standards. Any organisation can create such a standard. 
Nation states (or supra-national bodies such as the EU or ASEAN) also set 
standards on food safety, and they frequently differ. Non-governmental bodies
can also take initiatives around standards. These vary enormously in scope 
and ambition. At one end of the scale, there is the Michigan food processors’
standards for microbiological contamination in blueberries (Bain et al. 2005: 
78–9), designed to eliminate risks for processors making uncooked products, 
such as fruit yoghurts and ice cream. At the other end, there is the Global 
Food Safety Initiative (GFSI),5 which benchmarks different standards in order 
to facilitate the sourcing practices of its members, which are major global food
retailers and processors.
2 Adoption. As Brunsson and Jacobsson have argued anyone can create a 
standard. The impact of the standard depends upon how extensively it is 
adopted. In adopting a standard, organisations make a decision to require it 
as a condition of access to territories or markets over which they have some 
jurisdiction. For governments, this is the capacity to make standards 
mandatory for producers within their territory and to impose such standards 
on foodstuffs imported into their territory (the SPS agreement forbids them to 
do the latter without the former). Guidelines or voluntary standards developed 
by others become mandatory. In the case of imported products, these 
standards are not addressed directly to producers in exporting countries, but 
rather to the trader that imports them, and/or to the authorities of exporting 
states. It is these two groups that are expected to comply with the standard. 
3 For nation states, decisions to make particular standards mandatory (legally 
binding) are governed by the SPS agreement of the WTO. This allows states 
to deviate from the standards set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, but 
such deviations have to be based on scientific risk assessment and are 
subject to mandatory notification and consultation with relevant trading 
partners. Adoption is also regulated by rules concerning the notification of 
such standards.
4 For companies, the situation is much easier. As private bodies they are not 
regulated by the SPS agreement, although since 2005 there has been 
discussion in the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Committee 
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5 See www.ciesnet.com/2-wwedo/2.2-programmes/2.2.foodsafety.gfsi.asp for more details.
about this issue.6 For companies, a decision to make a standard obligatory 
for suppliers only means making a decision about what they are willing to buy
or sell. The key challenge is a market one. If they want to insist on certain 
standards for the goods and services they purchase, can they find suppliers 
who fulfil this requirement, as well as others (such as price or delivery or 
quality)? For suppliers, adopting a standard depends on whether or not they 
can find a buyer who is willing to pay a price that covers the cost of the 
standard.
5 Enforcement. The credibility of any standard depends upon enforcement. The 
process of monitoring has to be credible and subject to rules of good practice.
The credibility of inspection also depends on its quality. Accordingly, rules 
concerning the operation and licensing of testing laboratories are also part of 
the standards system. Similarly, the integrity of the third-party audits that 
formed the basis for most process standards is based on the accreditation of 
Certification Bodies (CBs) in accordance with ISO regulations on certification. 
The National Accreditation Bodies responsible for the auditing should, 
according to ISO recommendations, be members of the International 
Accreditation Forum. Here again, we see a multi-layered system of public 
regulation, in which international bodies such as the ISO provide recommen
dations which not only define procedures for establishing standards, but also 
for assuring the quality of the inspection and of the inspection of the 
inspectors.
6 Equivalence. Finally, given the many national and international bodies, both 
public and private, involved in food safety standards, the issue of equivalence
becomes critical for two reasons. First, the proliferation of standards imposes 
costs, and for this reason there are many initiatives to benchmark standards. 
Second, establishing equivalence in national, mandatory regulations is critical 
for international trade. Once again, there are guidelines for establishing 
equivalence issued by the CAC (Codex Alimentarius Commission 1999), and 
this issue is included in the SPS agreement (WTO n.d.: Article 4).
The way in which international bodies provide a framework for national food safety
legislation is shown in Figure 2.1.
6 The SPS agreement does not explicitly limit its scope to public standards, but equally its rights and 
obligations apply to ‘Members’, which are governments (WTO 2007: 4). While some member states 
sought to bring collective private standards into the purview of the SPS system, Henson (2008) argues
strongly that the case for doing so is weak.
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Figure 2.1 The role of international guidelines in food safety
3 Private standards and food safety
Private standards coexist alongside the public system of food safety regulation.
The growth of private standards is shown in Table 3.1, which was prepared for the
WTO SPS Measures Committee. The table shows, firstly, that there are many 
private standards. The table also distinguishes between different types of private
standards. First, there are standards developed by individual companies. These
are frequently presented to consumers in the form of labels that identify products
as having superior characteristics to products sold by competitors. Although only
two such standards are cited in the report, a study for the European Union 
identified many such standards across Europe (EU/DG Joint Research Centre
2005: 18). The WTO report refers to these as ‘individual firm schemes’. In this
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report, they will be referred to as ‘company standards’. Second, there are collec-
tive schemes, which bring together groups of actors in the food industry. The WTO
report distinguished between national and international schemes. The difference
between them is between those standards whose primary creators are within a
national boundary, and those standards whose creators and promoters come from
more than one country. In terms of their application, however, the so-called
‘national’ standard can be required by, for example, a buyer in one country from a
supplier in another. Similarly, standards created by one organisation can be taken
up by others in other countries. Within the ‘collective international schemes’, the
report includes both standards administered by private sector bodies, such as
EUREPGAP and SQF, and the standards developed by the ISO. The collective
standards (national and international) administered by private sector bodies will be
referred to as ‘private voluntary standards’.
Table 3.1 Examples of private standards in food
Source: WTO (2007: 2).
In many respects, these standards incorporate the same tendencies as seen for
public standards. Process standards based on third-party certification of 
production, handling and processing are prominent. These standards tie into the
meta-standards (such as the HACCP approach) that shape food standards
around the world, and they also make extensive use of the public standards 
infrastructure through their use of accreditation systems and public laboratories.
As with public standards, there is also an increasing challenge of establishing
equivalence. The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) defines its first objective as
promoting convergence between food standards through a benchmarking
process.7
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Individual firm schemes Collective national
schemes
Collective international
schemes
Tesco Nature’s Choice Assured Food Standards EUREPGAP
Carrefour Filière Qualité British Retail Consortium
Global Standard – Food
International Food
Standard
QS Qualitat Sicherheit Global Food Safety
Initiative
Label Rouge ISO 22000: Food safety
management systems
Food and Drink
Federation/British Retail
Consortium Technical
Standard for the Supply
of Identity Preserved
Non-Genetically Modified
Food Ingredients and
Product
Safe Quality Food (SQF)
1000 and 2000
ISO 22005: Traceability in
the feed and food chain
3.1 Product differentiation versus risk control
Standards, whether voluntary or made mandatory by governments, are devices
for coordinating agri-food chains across borders and across companies. Not 
surprisingly, the literature on global value chains provides a framework for
analysing such coordination. This approach recognises two distinct motives for
explicit coordination in value chains: product differentiation and control of risks.
Humphrey and Schmitz (2001: 23–4) argue that coordination is required when
buyers wish to purchase non-standard products. The purchase of non-standard
products is often associated with product differentiation. At the same time, value
chain coordination is also a means of controlling risk: it provides non-standard 
levels of assurances about factors such as reliability of delivery, product quality,
production processes, etc. In manufacturing, many of the basic processes of total
quality management are concerned with controlling for conformity, with such 
controls extending from within-the-enterprise controls on production processes to
inter-enterprise controls that extend along the supply chain. In this literature, 
introducing global standards such as the ISO 9000 quality standard has the effect
of standardising quality systems across countries, so that buyers and suppliers in
these countries have a common language to recognise and discuss quality
issues. This reduces the cost of vertical coordination and facilitates transactions.
At the same time, the standard also shifts the obligations and the costs of meeting
the standard from the buyer to the seller. Without an established quality standard,
the buyer would have to search out companies that meet its quality requirements
and possibly pay a premium for requiring a non-standard level of quality. With the
standard, it is the supplier that has to gain certification and bear the risk that the
investment in certification may not produce a return. However, by taking this route,
the buyer also sacrifices product differentiation. The suppliers will be certified to
the quality standard that is available to competing firms. 
The literature on agricultural value chains emphasises both product differentiation
and risk control, although frequently only one is emphasised at any one time. For
example, Young and Hobbs emphasise product differentiation as a driver of value
chain coordination:
The effects of consumer demand for differentiated food products and of
advances in agricultural biotechnology have been to encourage a movement
away from commodity production towards the production of food products
with diverse characteristics for niche markets.
(Young and Hobbs 2002: 429)
An analysis which associates value chain coordination with risk management is
provided by van Roekel et al.:
Food safety concerns have led to the development of “integral chain-care”
tools such as social accountability, good agricultural practice (GAP), total
quality management, and HACCP (hazard analysis at critical control points).
Implementation of such tools throughout a cross-border supply chain enables
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chain partners to ensure the quality and safety of their products and 
guarantees’ (2002: 10).
Standards are one means of codifying inter-firm communication and achieving
value chain coordination. Different needs for coordination lead to different types of
standards. Not only this, different types of actors in value chains have different
coordination priorities.
An analysis of quality assurance systems in the European food industry has 
proposed a typology of standards that provides a basis for analysing the differing
dynamics of standards for product differentiation and standards for risk control.
This work (EU/DG Joint Research Centre 2005) divides standards into two main
groups:
l Standards that are ‘mainly aimed at differentiating and enhancing the 
company and/or company product before customers’ (2005: 34). In this paper,
we will refer to these as ‘standards for differentiation’.
l Standards ‘mainly aimed at ensuring food safety and controls over company 
production processes. In this case, the scheme and related processes are not
meant to highlight or enhance the product or process characteristics, but on 
the contrary to guarantee compliance with univocal and predefined standards’
(2005: 33). The motivation for this is not only concern for consumer welfare, 
but also (critically) protecting brand reputations. In this respect, the increased 
use of ‘naming and shaming’ with respect to food business compliance with 
statutory requirements was a powerful motivator for the development of such 
standards.8 In this paper, we will refer to these as ‘standards for risk control’.
The analysis also identifies differences in geographical scope, sponsors and links
with consumers, as shown in Table 3.2. The authors argue that standards aimed
at differentiating products are mainly national, mainly developed by public bodies
or groups/consortia of producers and aimed at consumers. In contrast, standards
aimed at risk control are mainly supranational, mainly developed by retailers
(rarely producers), and mainly business-to-business standards that ‘hardly ever
reach end-users’ (2005: 34).
There are, of course, exceptions to these generalisations, and the use of qualifiers
such as ‘mainly’ and ‘hardly ever’ reflects this. The most obvious exceptions to the
generalisation are company standards such as Tesco’s Nature’s Choice. They are
clearly standards for differentiation developed by retailers and aimed at the 
consumer. Or, alternatively, some standards for risk control are developed by 
producer organisations. The British meat industry’s ‘Red Tractor’ standard would
be an example. The summary of the Red Tractor standard for beef and lamb
says:
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8 An undated and unauthored account of a PIP roundtable in Brussels in July 2000 includes a reference
to a complaint from EU importers about ‘naming and shaming’, which was seen as particularly 
problematic in the UK. Similarly, a BBC report from 1999 refers to ‘Supermarkets that sell produce 
contaminated with pesticides are to be named in a government report next week’ (BBC Online 
Network 1999). This is the climate of reputational risk that EUREPGAP was designed to address. A
similar risk faced German supermarkets after a Friends of the Earth campaign highlighted pesticides 
in food, and most of the German supermarkets joined EUREPGAP in 2007.
Table 3.2 Two types of quality assurance standards
Source: Summarised from EU/DG Joint Research Centre (2005: 33–4).
The Assurance Standards are designed to ensure that the animals’ welfare
needs are not compromised at any stage of its life, the environment is 
protected and not damaged by the farming activities, the animals are always
identifiable and traceable and are moved in clean vehicles so that the beef
and lamb produced is free from contamination and safe to eat.
(Source: www.redtractor.org.uk/site/rt_page_wide.php?section_
id=3&page_id=59)
An association of the whole industry, including producers,9 defines a standard
which is clearly aimed at ensuring food safety, and which has a clear consumer
orientation through the Red Tractor label.
A slightly different way of looking at this issue is to think about the different 
motivations of actors in the value chain and the consequences of this for the way
in which standards are used and presented. It is worth noting that standards
which are very similar can actually be used in very different ways. For example,
there is a large degree of overlap between EUREPGAP and Tesco’s Nature’s
Choice standard – so much so that third-party audits for the two standards are
often carried out simultaneously on the grounds that (in the words of a manager at
one leading exporter in Kenya): 
For Tesco, we still have to have Tesco’s Nature’s Choice. They will claim that
it is a higher standard than EUREPGAP, but the fact is that you do the same
audit on the same day, with the same person. And 95 per cent of it is 
common. So ultimately, what they are using it for is a marketing tool.
(Exporter 1, Respondent 1)10
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9 The ‘Red Tractor’ website identifies the ownership of the organisation running the scheme, Assured 
Food Standards, in the following terms, ‘AFS is owned by the entire food industry. It represents 
interests from each of the key links in the food chain, including the National Farmers’ Union, the Ulster
Farmers’ Union, the Meat & Livestock Commission, Dairy UK and the British Retail Consortium’. 
Source; www.redtractor.org.uk/site/rt_page.php?section_id=3&page_id=14.
10 See Appendix 1 for details of the people interviewed in Kenya for this study.
Standards for 
differentiation
Standards for risk 
control
Geographical scope Mainly national Mainly ‘supranational’
Proposers Public bodies or
groups/consortia of 
producers
Mainly retailers or retail
organisations, rarely 
producers
Link to consumers End users targeted by
brand or promotion 
activities
Business-to-business
standards not focused
on consumers
So, the key factor is intent. Tesco ‘sells’ Nature’s Choice to the consumer as 
identifying something superior about the product. The claim is that the product is
better than a standard product. The opening paragraph of the Nature’s Choice
web pages states that, ‘Nature’s Choice is our own integrated farm management
scheme and is unique to Tesco. Introduced in 1992, it sets environmental 
standards and specifies shape, size, taste, variety and shelf life requirements.’11
Safety is not mentioned on the webpage. In 2005, on a webpage no longer 
available on the Tesco site, Tesco identified the ‘seven pillars’ of Nature’s Choice
as rational use of plant protection products; rational use of fertilisers and manures;
pollution prevention protection of human health; use of energy, water and other
natural resources; recycling and re-use of material; wildlife and landscape 
conservation and enhancement.12 Once again, the appeal is predominantly an
environmental one, not to food safety.
Conversely, the British Retail Consortium is closer to the ‘Red Tractor’ approach,
emphasising food safety, but also protecting members. It is very explicit about the
function of its ‘Global Standard Food’, and the second sentence on its website
states: ‘It is designed to be used as a pillar to help retailers and brand owners
with their “due diligence” defence, should they be subject to a prosecution by the
enforcement authorities. Under EU food Law, retailers and brand owners have a
legal responsibility for their brands.’13 The due diligence defence and the transfer
of responsibilities for food safety along the value chain by powerful food business
operators are also very relevant to EUREPGAP.
With these issues in mind, we can now reformulate and explain the different 
patterns in standards shown in Table 3.2:
1 Retailers want consumers to have confidence in all the food they sell. Food 
safety is a non-negotiable issue. In the UK, supermarkets have chosen, 
hitherto, not to compete on basic food safety. Company standards which are 
designed to differentiate the product of one retailer from another have to 
appeal to consumers on the basis of other factors, such as environmental 
impact, animal welfare, healthy eating, etc. However, in Germany, super-
markets are competing on the basis of food safety, making competing claims 
about levels of pesticides. These claims are not incorporated into standards. 
When company standards are developed, they appeal to particular national 
consumer preferences, so even internationalised retailers will not develop 
international company standards.
2 Groups of retailers do develop and adopt private voluntary standards. These 
cover areas such as food safety, which cannot be presented to consumers as 
product differentiators. These standards are often ‘defensive’, developed in 
response to external pressures that could lead to reputational damage. One 
very significant source of such pressures is public legislation. So, in the case 
of EUREPGAP, discussed further below, EU regulations on pesticides, 
11 www.tescocorporate.com/page.aspx?pointerid=1209EAE16DDB49C0A094A60CFF1FBFA9.
12 www.tesco.com/everylittlehelps/environmentdetail.htm#sp.
13 www.brc.org.uk/standards/default.asp.
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combined with increasing company liability for food safety create risks. Given 
that these risks potentially arise at multiple points along the value chain, it 
makes sense to view food safety as a value chain issue. This is why the 
private voluntary standards developed by retailers are value chain focused. 
The objectives of these private voluntary standards initiated by retailers are: 
(i) to lower the cost of value chain coordination; (ii) to transfer the cost along 
the supply chain; and, (iii) in some cases, to transfer liabilities arising out of 
the changing legal framework for food, notably increasing responsibility on 
food business operators for the safety of the food they sell. However, risks 
also arise from other areas, such as consumer perceptions relating to issues 
such as animal welfare. In such cases, private voluntary standards can be 
extended to include issues such as environmental impact, labour standards 
and animal welfare. Given that supply chains are increasingly inter-
nationalised, it makes sense for these standards to be international in scope 
(but still limited to the participating suppliers and buyers).
3 Producers, and producer organisations, do have an interest in differentiating 
their products in terms of food safety and in terms of environmental impact, 
etc, as well. This explains the huge variety of labels developed by producers. 
Whereas retailers would not like to claim that some of the food they sell is 
particularly safe, as it implies that other food in the store is less safe, food 
producers have an interest in claiming that their food is safe in comparison 
with the food of other producers. Therefore, they have an interest in 
promoting food labels that focus on safety. Producer associations tend to be 
national in scope, and so these standards are more likely to be national. 
4 Producers and producer organisations do also have an interest in business-
to-business standards (invisible to the consumer) to the extent that they 
provide assurances to retailers about quality, safety and conformance to legal 
requirements. But these will struggle to gain prominence in the face of 
retailer-driven standards. Standards presented to consumers act as brands. 
As Paul Duguid (2003) has argued, the point in the value chain at which a 
brand is defined has an impact on the options for the different companies in 
the chain, and through this the returns they can expect to obtain. If a group of
suppliers develop a standard that consumers want, the retailer is then forced 
to source it from the brand owners, reducing their sourcing options and 
power. Large retailers try to undermine brand power, or try to gain some 
control over it (one interpretation of how Fairtrade has been mainstreamed in 
the UK). For this reason, widely dispersed producers have trouble in 
establishing brands in the face of retailer power. 
3.1.1 Private voluntary standards in the era of globalisation
Many issues of food safety would arise even if trade in food was relatively limited.
The increasing complexity of food processing and food value chains increases
risk, and perceptions of risk and the ability to test for them are also increasing.
Nevertheless, increasing trade in food presents particular challenges for food
safety. Just as the requirements of national food safety systems are becoming
more complex and more oriented to process controls, the geographical coverage
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of these rules has extended. Globalisation and the industrialisation of the food
industry have transformed food production, processing and delivery. Global 
sourcing means that food value chains are both geographically extended (moving
across more countries) and fragmented across more enterprises. This creates
new challenges for food safety and the coordination of increasingly complex food
systems:
1 Global sourcing creates new sources of risk as food is transported and 
processed to a greater degree. Transport and storage alone create risk. 
Increased processing exacerbates this problem: there are more occasions 
during which food can deteriorate or suffer contamination. 
2 Food value chains are increasingly fragmented across multiple enterprises 
and great distances. This creates new challenges for coordination and 
control. How can control be exercised along food value chains when food 
travels great distances and passes through many different hands?
3 Globalisation brings together quite diverse food production systems that are 
heterogeneous in terms of producer characteristics, regulatory frameworks, 
environmental conditions, technical expertise and consumer preferences. 
There are various possible responses to these challenges. Individual companies
could meet these risks by increasing direct supervision along their supply chains,
and this is often the first response to a new food safety challenge. Individual 
companies could also create their own standards – identifying risks, introducing
procedures to address them and creating a system of verifying compliance with
these procedures. But, internationalised private voluntary food standards are an
increasingly common means of addressing these challenges. In part, this is
because this not only has the potential to reduce transactions costs (i.e. reducing
the costs of value chain coordination), but also transferring some of these costs
from the food business operators who have the prime responsibility for food safety
to producers of food products.
3.2 The EUREPGAP standard
The EUREPGAP standard for fresh fruit and vegetables was developed by a
European consortium of fresh fruit and vegetable importers and retailers. Eurep,
the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group, was established in 1996 by 13 
retailers, and according to van der Grijp et al. (2004: 2), the driving force was UK
retailers. These companies were partly responding to the demands of the UK’s
Food Safety Act, which placed new obligations on food business operators to take
responsibility for food safety, and to the EU’s programme of harmonisation of
MRLs for pesticides, which drastically restricted the range of pesticides that were
acceptable at any level of detectable residue and greatly reduced acceptable
residue levels for others. This, combined with the UK government’s policy of 
‘naming and shaming’ retailers whose products were found to have excessive or
prohibited residues, created serious reputational risks for these UK retailers (Chan
and King 2000).
In the face of this challenge, Eurep was established ‘with the aim of making a first
step towards European-wide harmonisation of minimum standards for integrated
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production’ (van der Grijp et al. 2004: 2). Its EUREPGAP standard, developed in
1997, focused specifically on fruit and vegetables. According to Healy and
Gunningham: 
In November 1997, members agreed on the first draft protocol for Good
Agricultural Practice (GAP), which represented the first step towards inte-
grated production, and a harmonization of production standards. In August
1999, the first official version of the EUREPGAP Protocol was subject to 
consultation with growers, produce marketing organizations, verification 
bodies, agrochemical companies, farmers’ organizations and scientific 
institutions. All comments were considered and many of them were included
in the new official GAP Version 2000.
(Healy and Gunningham 2003: 33)
From this beginning, Eurep and the EUREPGAP standard has developed into a
broad-based standard, applying to an increasing range of products and 
benchmarked against other standards around the world. The range of products
covered by EUREPGAP certification has also increased to include green coffee,
flowers, and (in preparation) aquaculture products. In what follows, reference will
only be made to the fruit and vegetable members and activities of EUREPGAP.
3.2.1 The growth and transformation of EUREPGAP
Since 1997, both Eurep and the EUREPGAP standard have changed sub-
stantially. The membership of Eurep has changed in two ways. First, the number
of supermarkets and their countries of origin have expanded. Most recently,
German supermarkets have joined the organisation, largely in response to
adverse publicity regarding pesticide residues in vegetables, which is one of the
central issues addressed by the EUREPGAP standard.14 Supermarket member-
ship remains, however, predominantly northern European. In April 2007, 28 of the
31 ‘retailer and food service’ members came from the UK, Ireland, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the Scandinavian countries.15
The second significant change has been the incorporation of producers and
processors into the EUREPGAP fruit and vegetables system. In April 2007, 109
companies were producer/supplier members (i.e. agricultural producers, 
processors, traders and their associations, rather than retailers) of EUREPGAP
fruit and vegetables. Seventy-nine of the suppliers were from the European Union
and Switzerland, but there were 11 members from Africa and eight from Latin
America. As important for the organisation, the supplier members are now 
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14 In 2003, there were six Eurep retailer members in the UK, four in the Netherlands, one in Germany 
and a further 12 spread across nine European Countries (Campbell 2005: 10). In 2007, there were 31 
European retailer members of Eurep, 19 of these were in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, 
which have 7, 6 and 6 members respectively (data from www.eurep.org).
15 In April 2007, EUREPGAP had one retailer member in Japan and one in Spain, plus membership from
McDonald’s Europe. Membership does change over time. Past members not listed in April 2007 
include Monoprix from France and Pick ‘n Pay from South Africa.
integrated into EUREPGAP’s governance structure. Retailer and producer/supplier
members are represented equally on the organisation’s sector committees, and
the EUREPGAP board also has equality of representation from the two groups. 
At the same time, EUREPGAP has become an organisation with global 
aspirations.16 It describes itself as ‘a private sector body that sets voluntary 
standards for the certification of agricultural products around the globe.’17
Diversification of the membership, noted above, is only a part of this process.
EUREPGAP globalises its standards by benchmarking them against other 
international food safety standards such as SQF, and negotiating with other global
food safety initiatives such as the SAI and the Aquaculture Certification Council.
Even more important from the perspective of export agriculture in developing
countries, EUREPGAP has adopted a policy of actively promoting benchmarked
national standards that are regarded as equivalent to EUREPGAP. These offer the
possibility of adapting EUREPGAP’s own protocols to national circumstances
while maintaining recognition of the national standard’s value. By 2005, national
technical working groups to work towards developing equivalent national GAPs
had been established in nine European countries, plus Argentina, Chile, Kenya,
South Africa, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand (Garbutt 2007: 19). Further
indications of the international scope of EUREPGAP are the 75 countries with 
certified growers and the 19 languages into which the EUREPGAP protocol has
been translated (Garbutt 2007: 8–9). Other countries, such as Thailand, have also
developed their versions of EUREPGAP.
The standards set by EUREPGAP have also evolved over time. The range of
products covered by its standards has extended beyond fruit and vegetables and
into products such as tea, salmon and wheat. EUREPGAP is now a standards-
setting body, still controlled by its members, but seeking to maintain its position in
a globally competitive standards-setting environment and creating a unified set of
standards for agricultural production of which the fruit and vegetable protocol is
one module. It defines its standard as ‘a single integrated standard with modular
applications for different product groups, ranging from plant and livestock 
production to plant propagation materials and compound feed manufacturing.’18
Its legal identity is FoodPLUS GmbH. EUREPGAP defines the relationship as,
‘EUREPGAP is a global Scheme and Reference for Good Agricultural Practice,
which is managed by the EUREPGAP Secretariat. FoodPLUS is a non-profit,
industry-owned and governed organization that legally represents the EUREPGAP
Secretariat’ (EUREPGAP 2005b: 4). 
In recognition of fundamental shifts in its objectives and membership EUREPGAP
rebranded itself as GLOBALGAP in 2007 (with a slightly different logo – 
GLOBALG.A.P.). The change was launched at the eighth Annual Conference in
Bangkok in September 2007.19 However, given that the organisation and its 
16 At some point, the organisation changed its name from Eurep to EUREPGAP.
17 See www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=9.
18 See www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=3.
19 See www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=9&idart=182.
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standard was known as EUREPGAP during the time of the study and the events
that it analyses, and given that most of the literature referred to was produced
prior to September 2007, this report will continue mostly to refer to EUREPGAP.
3.2.2 The EUREPGAP standard
The EUREPGAP standard was developed initially by and for European retailers in
response to external pressures relating to both food safety and the impacts of
their supply chains. EUREPGAP is a means of providing assurances for European
retailers that the food they were selling conforms to EU food safety standards and
that the retailers are meeting their responsibilities as food business operators to
ensure that the food they sell is safe. At the same time, EUREPGAP responds to
broader pressures from consumers and NGOs not only to provide safe food, but
also to meet the increasing concerns about the social and environmental impacts
of food production. These issues are particularly important to retailers that trade
heavily on their brand image as providers of safe and ethically-produced products. 
Version 1 of the EUREPGAP standard reflects these differing pressures by 
incorporating three different elements:20
l Food safety. European retailers have had to respond to the increased 
stringency of EU regulations (for example, severe limitations on pesticide 
residues and concerns about soil contamination) and also changing customer 
perceptions about food safety following a range of food scares in Europe in 
the 1990s. Food safety is the core element of EUREPGAP and by far the 
greater part of the standard is devoted to this.21
l Environmental impact. Environmental issues have moved up the social and 
political agenda in Europe. This is reflected in both the environmental 
concerns of the EUREPGAP standard and the increasing importance of 
environmental issues in company standards such as Tesco’s Nature’s Choice.
l Worker health and safety and worker rights. This issue is not a requirement of
the European Union, but it is an issue for NGOs in Europe, particularly in the 
UK, where the UK government formed a tripartite alliance with NGOs and 
trade unions to develop the Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI).22
The standard is revised periodically. Version 2 of the standard retains the core
elements of Version 1,23 but there are differences in language between them,
mostly designed to make the audit process clearer and more uniform. There is
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20 This analysis is based on English-language Rev02 of Version 1, issued in September 2001 (EUREP
GAP 2001). 
21 In part, this is product specific. The EUREPGAP standard for aquaculture has much more extensive 
protocols for environmental impact and impact on local communities, reflecting the many concerns 
raised about the impact of aquaculture in developing countries.
22 See, www.ethicaltrade.org/.
23 The analysis of Revision 2 is based on the English language Control Points and Compliance Criteria 
for Version 2.1, revised in July 2005 (EUREPGAP 2005a).
also an increased emphasis on documentation and the introduction of some new
requirements, particularly relating to hygiene during harvesting and on-farm post-
harvest processing and packing. In their essentials, however, the two versions are
very similar.
The crucial features of EUREPGAP standard for this analysis are: 
1 EUREPGAP is a process standard. It tries to achieve its goals of producing 
safe food under reasonable labour conditions and without damage to the 
environment by identifying risk factors and establishing practices to counter 
these risks. These practices can vary from specifications about work or 
training to the calibration of equipment, storage of chemicals and hygiene 
practices for harvesting. Although there is some testing of products, the basic 
principle underlying the standard is risk identification and risk management 
through documented rules and procedures. In line with the European 
approach to food safety described above, process controls are complemented
by testing of soil and water used for irrigation.
2 EUREPGAP is often described as a ‘pre farm-gate’ standard. It extends the 
principles of risk management to farm production by specifically focusing on 
good agricultural practices relating to preparation, growing, harvesting and 
packaging, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
3 It only extends off-farm in the case of farmer groups, where produce is taken 
to collection centres and graded and stored prior to being sent for processing.
A different set of standards – for example, the British Retail Consortium 
‘Global Standard Food’ for good manufacturing practice – applies at the 
processing stage.24
4 EUREPGAP is a private voluntary standard. Unlike regulations developed by 
national and supra-national (i.e. the EU) governments, it has no legal force. 
However, increasing concentration in food retailing means that large retailers 
have economic power and act as gatekeepers between producers and 
consumers. Grievink (2002) suggests that 110 supermarket buying desks 
channel food between 3 million producers and 160 million consumers in 
Europe. Even though supermarkets do not buy directly from producers, their 
market power and gatekeeper role enables them to transmit requirements 
along the value chain.
5 There is no EUREPGAP label. EUREPGAP is a business-to-business 
standard which is not made evident to consumers.
6 EUREPGAP is based on third-party certification. Producers are audited and 
certified by accredited CBs (approved by FoodPlus GmbH). The role of the 
auditor is to check that (i) the farm (or farmer group) has the capacity to follow
the rules, and (ii) there is documentation to show that rules have been 
followed. Documentation of practices, such as records of pesticide spraying, 
worker training, equipment checks, use of permitted chemicals, decisions 
24 Details of the BRC Global Standard Food can be found at www.brc.org.uk/standards/default.asp. 
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being taken by staff qualified to make them, are largely or entirely based on 
documentation (for more information, see below Section 4.2).
7 The standard is expressed as a set of rules. These are of three types: ‘major 
musts’ that must be met in their entirety; ‘minor musts’ for which a 5 per cent 
non-compliance rate is acceptable at the time of inspection, and ‘recomm-
endations’, which are just that (EUREPGAP 2005b: 11). 
8 As with all process standards, traceability is an essential part. This estab-
lishes and maintains the link between the farm (and even the field) of origin 
and a particular batch of products as it moves forward along the value chain. 
9 EUREPGAP is a private standard owned by FoodPlus GmbH, but provision is
allowed for the development of national GAPs which can then be bench
marked to EUREPGAP.
The focus of this paper is the consequences of EUREPGAP for small farmers in
Kenya and the response of aid donors to the challenges that it appeared to 
create. Therefore a fuller discussion of the implications of EUREPGAP on the
farm will be included in the following section which focuses on Kenya. 
Figure 3.1 Scope of EUREPGAP
Source: EUREPGAP (2005b: 5).
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4 EUREPGAP in Kenya
This case study focuses on the export horticulture sector in Kenya and how aid
donors responded to the challenges created by the introduction of the 
EUREPGAP standard by retailers in the sector’s main export markets. It highlights
the profound ways in which EUREPGAP affects small farmers and the extent to
which donors had an imperfect understanding of the challenges that it posed. 
It begins with a brief description of the nature and importance of export 
horticulture in Kenya and then goes on to discuss how EUREPGAP affects on-
farm practices and the responsibilities of exporters and importers in the value
chain.
4.1 Export horticulture in Kenya
Export horticulture was one of the successes of the Kenyan economy in the
1980s and 1990s. Exports expanded in volume and value and many jobs were
created. Kenya has been one of the most competitive African exporters of fresh
vegetables, and an industry has grown up which successfully combines large,
sophisticated exporters and small farmers. The characteristics of this industry
have been described by numerous authors.25 These have emphasised the 
potential of the sector, its rapid growth, the importance of links to large retailers in
Europe and the benefits to the rural economy. 
The success of the industry has been in marked contrast to other export-oriented
sectors of the Kenyan rural economy. The revenues derived from exports of 
traditional agricultural products such as coffee and tea were stagnant or declining
in the 1990s. In the case of coffee, for example, both the volume and price per
tonne of exports from Kenya to the EU fell by about 30 per cent in the 1990s,
resulting in an overall decline of revenue from coffee exports to this market of 60
per cent between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the twentyfirst 
century (calculated from Eurostat 1998; Eurostat 2002). In contrast, export 
volumes of fresh vegetables grew strongly throughout the 1990s, and unit values
remained firm.26 
The performance of the fresh vegetables export sector is shown in Table 4.1.
From 1989 to 1999, Kenyan exports to the EU of the two main fresh vegetable
categories, HS 0708 and HS 0709, grew at an annual average rate of more than
12 per cent. In this period, Kenya slightly increased its share of total African
exports to the EU of both product categories, even though its market share for
25 See, for example, Muendo and Tschirley (2004a), Tschirley et al. (2004), Jaffee (1995; 2003), Dolan 
and Humphrey (2000; 2004), Okello (2005) and McCulloch and Ota (2002).
26 The EUREPGAP standard also applies to fruit. However, fresh fruit exports are only a fraction of 
vegetable exports and growing more slowly. In 2002, vegetable exports were six times greater than 
fruit exports (Plantconsult 2003: 17). For horticulture as a whole, The Netherlands ranks with the UK 
as a destination, but this is because of its role in flower exports. As will be seen below, the UK is the 
leading importer of vegetables.
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both was already high in 1989. From 1999 to 2006, exports from sub-Saharan
Africa came under increasing pressure from North African countries, and growth
slackened – to 9 per cent per annum for peas and beans and almost to zero for
‘other vegetables’. As can be seen in the table, the sub-Saharan African share of
total African exports fell from 76.1 per cent to 55.6 per cent in the case of peas
and beans (HS 0708), and from 59.8 per cent to 37.1 per cent for ‘other 
vegetables’ (HS 0709). However, Kenya did much better than other sub-Saharan
African exporters in this second period.
Table 4.1 Imports of fresh and chilled vegetables into the EU from
various regions, 1989, 1999 and 2006 (Ecus 000s) (a)
Notes: (a) Data refers to imports of the 12 EU member countries in 1989. The Ecu was the European unit 
of account based on a basket of EU currencies used prior to the introduction of the Euro.
(b) All of Africa, less Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan.
(c) Harmonised system 0708: leguminous vegetables, shelled or unshelled, fresh or chilled.
(d) Harmonised system 0709: Other vegetables, fresh or chilled (excl. potatoes, tomatoes, 
alliaceous vegetables, edible brassicas, lettuce ‘lactuca sativa’ and chicory ‘cichorium spp.’, 
carrots, turnips, salad beetroot, salsify, celeriac, radishes and similar edible…).
Source: Eurostat (1998) and Eurostat COMEXT database 
(http://fd.comext.eurostat.cec.eu.int/xtweb/mainxtnet.do, data downloaded June 2007).
The horticulture market is highly competitive. Kenya, along with other sub-
Saharan African producers, has been at an increasing disadvantage compared to
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All Africa Sub-SaharanAfrica (b) Kenya
Peas and beans (c)
Imports into EU (ECUs, 000s)
1989 51,491 40,759 23,939
1999 166,580 126,739 78,590
2006 354,304 197,062 145,861
CAGR, 1989–1999 (b) 12.5 12.0 12.6
CAGR, 1999–2006 11.4 6.5 9.2
Market shares (%)
1989 100 79.2 46.5
1999 100 76.1 47.2
2006 100 55.6 41.2
Other vegetables (d)
Imports into EU (ECUs, 000s)
1989 26,650 14,351 7,410
1999 82,578 49,399 23,574
2006 168,470 62,458 24,602
CAGR, 1989–1999 12.0 13.2 12.3
CAGR, 1999–2006 10.7 3.4 0.6
Market shares (%)
1989 100 53.8 27.8
1999 100 59.8 28.5
2006 100 37.1 14.6
some North African producers, who are much closer to the European market. In
some cases, they can ship vegetables by sea and land, which is much cheaper
than the airfreight required for fresh vegetables. As Jaffee (2005) has noted,
Kenya has responded to this competitiveness challenge by increasing value 
addition to its products. By producing more sophisticated products (for example,
baby leeks), products with a greater technological intensity (runner beans) and by
greatly increasing post-harvest processing to produce ready-to-eat and ready-to-
cook products and product combinations, Kenya has managed to compete on
product differentiation – moving away from the basic vegetables that are 
increasingly commodity items – and simultaneously reduce the importance of
transport costs in the overall price. These products are particularly in demand in
the United Kingdom, and Jaffee refers to this strategy as ‘riding the tail’ of the UK
supermarkets that are the main buyers of high-quality, differentiated products:
The tail-riding strategy, which appears to have been costly yet rewarding for
the firms involved, is essential for the industry as a whole, in view of its 
inability to compete directly on a cost basis with international suppliers who
face substantially lower freight costs.
(Jaffee 2005: 86)
The extent of the dependence of Kenyan exporters on the UK market is shown in
Figure 4.1. In the case of the ‘other vegetables’, HS 0709 category, the UK market
accounted for approximately 90 per cent of all Kenyan exports to the EU throug-
out the period. For peas and beans, HS 0708, there is a significant shift. Up until
1993, the UK was the second largest EU destination, behind France. After 1993,
however, the UK share of Kenyan exports rises rapidly, reaching a peak of 70 per
cent at the end of the 1990s. Although this dips to under 60 per cent at the 
beginning of the new century, it recovers in 2004–06 to nearly 65 per cent. The
next largest export market, which after 2001 was The Netherlands, accounts for
less than 20 per cent of total exports of peas and beans to the EU. This reliance
on the UK and Dutch markets for vegetable exports is also indicated by data 
provided by the official Kenyan source, the HCDA. Data cited by Nyagah (2007: 5)
for 2004 suggest that 70 per cent of all vegetable exports by value went to these
two markets.
Certification of farms to the EUREPGAP standard by supermarkets in the Eurep
group, introduced in January 2005, has to be viewed in this context. Kenya’s 
leading customers – the UK and the Netherlands – were also the countries whose
retailers were most committed to EUREPGAP. Five leading retailers in both 
countries were members of EUREPGAP. In the case of the UK, these were the
leading retail chains, which together accounted for over 70 per cent of fruit and
vegetable sales. In Kenya, perhaps more than anywhere else in the developing
world, EUREPGAP would have a very significant impact.
Furthermore, the introduction of EUREPGAP appeared to be likely to reinforce
concerns already expressed that the increasing complexity of buyer requirements
in the European market was placing demands on supply chains that small farmers
would find difficult or impossible to meet. Various studies have highlighted the
increasing complexity of safety standards and of buyers’ service requirements
(Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Jaffee 2005) and linked this to small farmer
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Figure 4.1 Kenya dependence on UK market for fresh vegetable
exports: 1989–2006
Sources: See Table 4.1.
exclusion from horticulture value chains. While the extent of this decline has been
contested by Muendo and Tschirley (2004b: 2), even these authors agree that a
link between complexity of export market demands and small farmer exclusion
has been made frequently in the literature.
The news was not all negative. On the contrary, it was also observed that the
well-organised and experienced Kenyan exports sector would have a competitive
advantage over other countries. The issue for Kenyan producers and exporters is
not the absolute cost of compliance, but rather its impact on competitiveness: the
costs of introducing and maintaining EUREPGAP compliance in Kenya as 
compared to the costs in competitor countries. As one senior manager in a 
leading export company observed in May 2005, EUREPGAP could be a competi-
tive advantage for Kenya:
I tend to be particularly positive about this [certification]. It might sound a bit
cynical, but it’s an entry barrier to the business. The more standards there are
the less competition we are going to have. It’s difficult for other people to get
them. It’s a competitive advantage. It costs us a lot of money. But it is still a
competitive advantage.
(Project interview, Exporter 1, Respondent 1)
But, there could be distributional consequences. As well as being a possible
advantage for Kenya over other exporting countries, it was predicted that the
introduction of EUREPGAP would tend to advantage large exporters over smaller
exporters, and large farmers over small farmers. 
In fact, the extent of the problem posed by EUREPGAP was viewed at the time as
even more worrying. While EUREPGAP is a private standard applicable only to
those companies that choose to adopt it, in the run-up to January 2005 many 
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people in Kenya, including parts of the government and some NGOs believed that
it was a mandatory European Union standard. As Wilson Songa, the Managing
Director of the government’s Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA)
observed in July 2005, ‘When some of the European retailers first announced
their standards for good agricultural practice (EurepGAP) there was panic in
Kenya and fears that our produce would no longer be wanted’ (Songa 2005: 2). 
The confusion is not hard to understand. Leaving aside the similarity in the two
names – EU and Eurep – the EUREPGAP standard was related quite closely to
the increasingly stringent standards imposed by the European Union for pesticide
residues and traceability. Furthermore, the General Food Law regulations (CEC
2002), which introduced traceability requirements, among other things, also took
effect in January 2005. In many ways, EUREPGAP was a direct response to the
risks facing retailers from the combination of increasingly stringent food safety
requirements and the legal responsibility placed on food business operators by
EU legislation. If these factors were not enough to sow confusion, Figure 4.1
shows quite clearly that the countries where EUREPGAP had the highest levels of
acceptance by retailers, the UK and the Netherlands, were also the countries
responsible for a considerable part of Kenyan fresh vegetable exports to Europe.
While not all of these exports were channelled through supermarkets (the retailers
insisting on EUREPGAP), a very high proportion certainly was.
4.2 EUREPGAP at the farm level
How does the implementation of EUREPGAP affect farms and farmers? What
facilities, equipment and procedures have to be in place at farm level in order to
meet the requirements of the standard? Clearly, implementing EUREPGAP
requires both investments in on-farm facilities: 
1 Safe handling of chemicals requires a specialised chemical store to be 
available, the use of suitable equipment for the proper and safe application of 
these chemicals, and facilities for disposal of chemicals. 
2 EUREPGAP hygiene standards require running water in the vicinity of 
produce handling and clean toilets for workers. 
3 At the post-harvest stage, too, facilities are required for grading, cooling and 
storage of produce. 
EUREPGAP also requires the implementation of appropriate agronomic 
techniques. The goal of reduced pesticide use and reductions in pesticide
residues requires the introduction of improved ‘soft’ technologies relating to 
agricultural practices – in particular, integrated crop management and integrated
pest management, including the use of natural predators, etc. Such farming 
practices are very different from those that have been practised widely in Kenyan
horticulture, particularly among small farmers, as observed by Okello and
Swinton:
Because of the heavy pest pressure in humid tropics and the insistence of
European consumers on freedom from pest and disease blemishes, green
bean production has relied heavily on pesticides. Prior to [International Food
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Safety Standards] era, farmers applied many different types of pesticides
(including those unregistered) on green beans, often with sprayers that were
old and poorly maintained and dosages that are higher than recommended.
Smallholders applied pesticides weekly regardless of need, using scant 
protective gear, and pesticide containers were either left in the field or 
disposed in domestic waste pits.
(Okello and Swinton 2005: 6) 
Similarly, Nyambo and Nyagah emphasised the extent to which pesticides were a
central part of smallholders’ production practices:
Surveys in 2002–03 showed that many smallholders growing green beans
believed that production was not possible without weekly applications of 
pesticides (equivalent to 10 applications per cropping cycle). Pesticides
accounted for the second largest component of production costs (14 per cent)
after labour and over 20 per cent of farmers reported having sought medical
treatment for health problems related to pesticide use. Harmonization of EU
pesticide legislation in 2000 led to a situation where many of the pesticides
widely used in East Africa had their residue levels set at the limit of detection,
thus effectively phasing them out for export production. Particularly affected
were organophosphate and carbamate insecticides and dithiocarbamate
fungicides, all widely used, cheap and available from the rural suppliers used
by smallholder producers.
(Nyambo and Nyagah 2006: 10)
However, equally challenging for farmers is the introduction of the risk 
identification, management and control systems associated with the process 
standard. Farms have to demonstrate that specific procedures designed to 
produce particular desired outputs are being followed, and decision-making 
relating to these procedures is appropriate and informed. This means creating and
keeping documentation about skills and record-keeping systems for decision-
making activities. For example, the list of requirements for EUREPGAP-certified
farms in relation to just one issue, pesticide use, includes:
A) Show that crop protection has been ‘achieved with the appropriate minimum 
crop protection products input’ (EUREPGAP 2005a: Control Point 8.1.1). This 
is to be achieved through documentation of crop protection product inputs, 
including the justifications for their use, their targets and the intervention 
thresholds.
B) The farm receives assistance with implementation of integrated pest 
management either through formal, documented training of the technically 
responsible person on the farm, or from an external consultant whose 
technical qualifications can be demonstrated (Control Point 8.1.4).
C) Crop protection products applied are appropriate for the target crop (Control 
Point 8.2.1).
D) Only registered crop protection products are used (Control Point 8.2.2).
E) Crop protection product application records ‘confirm that no crop protection 
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product has been used within the past 12 months on the crops grown under 
EUREPGAP destined for sale within the EU having been prohibited by the 
EU’ (Control Point 8.2.5).
F) Confirm that the choice of crop protection products has been made by a 
competent person, indicated through records as to the person making the 
choice and documentation of the person’s qualification or training. If the 
farmer makes the choice, his/her competence must also be indicated in this 
way (Control Points 8.2.6 and 8.2.7).
G) Crop protection records must indicate the name and variety of the crop 
treated, the geographical area, the exact date and the name and active 
ingredient (Control Points 8.3.1 to 8.3.4).
H) Use of the previous item together with harvesting dates to indicate that pre-
harvest intervals have been met (Control Point 8.3.10).
As EUREPGAP is a quality management system, the farm has to prove that it has
the capacity to operate this system. EUREPGAP requires that farms (or the PMO
in charge of a farmer group) self-inspect (i.e. first party audit) once a year, 
document this inspection and show that this inspection results in effective 
corrective action as a result (Control Points 2.2 to 2.4).
These controls are complemented by a traceability requirement. EUREPGAP
requires that for farms: ‘There is a documented traceability system that allows
EUREPGAP registered product to be traced back to the registered farm or, in a
Farmer Group, group of registered farms, and tracked forward to the immediate
customer’ (Control Point 1.1). 
Meeting these requirements is checked by means of a third party audit, which is
carried out annually. It is this third party audit that results in the certification. From
the farm-level perspective, this audit can take two forms.27 A single farm can be
the unit of certification. This is referred to as Option One. However, EUREPGAP
also allows for group certification, known as Option Two, which is particularly
important in the context of small farmers in Kenya. This has both costs and 
benefits. The main benefits are that the certification audit applies to only a sample
of the farms in the group, typically the square root of the total number of farms.
However, in return EUREPGAP places further requirements on farmer groups in
order to establish that they have the means to supervise and exercise control over
the different farms in the group. In particular, the group has to have a Quality
Management System in place (accompanied by a QMS manual adapted to the
specific farming conditions of the group), traceability, quality control and internal
audit (see EUREPGAP 2005b: 34–45 for further details). As summarised by
Ouma:
In order for [Option 2 farmer groups] to achieve compliance with EurepGAP
control points, the quality control system needs to be documented in a Quality
Management System (UMTS) manual containing standardised procedures
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27 More accurately, there are four certification options. In addition to Options One and Two, Options 
Three and Four refer to schemes that have been benchmarked as equivalent to EUREPGAP.
and recording sheets. The requirements of EurepGAP regulations dictate the
quality control standards is only achieved when all group members syste-
matically apply to [sic] the individual requirements laid out in the manual. This
manual must be based on a practical production system, which takes account
of local conditions and common farming practices in the respective country.
(Ouma 2007: 9)
Therefore, while Option 2 (certification in groups of farmers) has some 
advantages with respect to certification, it also creates its own organisational 
challenges, which will be discussed further below.
4.3 EUREPGAP and the responsibilities of exporters and importers
As was noted above, EUREPGAP is a farm-level standard. Nevertheless, it does
have consequences for exporters and importers. EUREPGAP is a retailer-
promoted standard that is specified as a condition of entry to the supply chains of
many leading food retailers in the European Union. While exporters and importers
do not need to apply EUREPGAP in their own packing and processing operations
(they do have to apply it where they have their own farms, which many exporters
in Kenya do), they still have responsibility for sourcing EUREPGAP-certified 
produce. If they want to retain the business of their customers, then they must
ensure that they can buy such produce. If, as will be argued below, pre-existing
suppliers of fresh vegetables have difficulties in meeting the standard, then it is
the exporters and importers that have to resolve the problem. If importers in the
key northern European markets for EUREPGAP-certified produce (the UK, The
Netherlands and Germany) cannot obtain such produce, then they will be obliged
either to switch to suppliers (exporters) that can supply the product, or they will
have to work with suppliers so that they become able to meet the EUREPGAP
requirement.28 The worst possible outcome for the importer is to be unable to
meet the retailer’s requirements.
The same pressures are transferred to the exporters. As EUREPGAP becomes a
condition of market access, so supplying certified produce becomes a necessity if
they want to stay in business. If they can grow such produce on their own farms,
or work with large-scale farmers, the problem may be relatively easy to solve. If,
as in Kenya, small farmers have been an important and cost-effective part of the
export industry, then exporters have to find a way to ensure that small farmers are
able to meet the standard’s requirements. Whatever the gap between the new
requirements and supplier capabilities, it is the exporters, in particular who should
be filling it. The cost of doing this may vary from exporter to exporter. For those
exporters with well-developed outgrower schemes for small farmers and well-
established food safety controls, the adjustment needed to meet EUREPGAP
should be less than for exporters with less-developed systems.
28 There are circumstances where importers will be vertically integrated back to production, as is the 
case with global fruit companies that own their own plantations, but this is typically not the case for 
most of the fresh vegetables sector.
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This transfer of responsibility from the retailer down the supply chain does not
apply only to the securing of certification. As was argued in Section 2, the key
challenge for a standard system is maintaining its integrity. Exporters and 
eventually importers will also be held responsible for shortcomings at the farm
level. The fact that farmers have been certified is not enough to absolve either
importers or exporters from their obligation to provide safe food to the retailers.
On the contrary, it is these links in the supply chain that should be reinforcing the
controls introduced by EUREPGAP. Here, we see the power asymmetry in the
value chain. For the retailers, EUREPGAP offers legal protection by providing a
‘due diligence’ defence should customers be sold unsafe food. For the importers
and exporters, EUREPGAP provides no defence against punishment by the
supermarkets for supplying this food. 
This, then, is the context in which donors were trying to find ways to increase, or
at least maintain, the benefits to small farmers that flowed from participation in
export horticulture value chains. How well did the donors identify the context in
which they were operating and devise strategies that would create the desired
outcome of increasing small farmer participation in export horticulture? 
5 EUREPGAP and the donor 
response
Development agencies, the Kenyan government and NGOs are concerned with
promoting the involvement of small farmers in export horticulture in the context of
an evolution of agricultural development policies that has led to three, possibly
conflicting, goals:
l High priority given to focusing agricultural development on reducing poverty 
and delivering pro-poor growth. Agricultural development, and in particular 
small farm development, is seen as a central strategy for reducing rural 
poverty. This is frequently expressed in terms of a concern to promote small 
farmers.29
l Emphasis on the potential for reducing poverty through increasing the access 
of small farmers to global markets, and in particular to the promotion of non-
traditional agricultural exports as a means of increasing farm incomes and 
supporting rural livelihoods. Horticulture is one of the sectors highlighted by 
such policies.
l Giving greater emphasis to the role of markets and the private sector in 
agriculture, as indicated by a switch in priority from state-funded extension 
services to business development services for small agricultural enterprises, 
29 For example, a key policy document on agriculture and poverty reduction from DFID observes that: 
‘Experience has shown that small farms can compete and they must be given every opportunity to do 
so. Only by doing this will agriculture’s full potential for growth and poverty reduction be realised. It is 
where we must focus our attention’ (DFID 2002: 16).
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together with greater involvement of the private sector in agricultural 
development, both as service providers and as customers for small farmers.
For these agencies, the immediate challenge was to ensure that the imple-
mentation of EUREPGAP in Kenya did not undermine these goals. If small 
farmers were excluded from export horticulture, this would have consequences for
the incomes of small farmers and employment on export smallholdings, with
broader knock-on effects in the non-farm rural economy. This concern was 
frequently translated into concern about income distribution and poverty reduction,
even though there is some evidence that large scale farms are equally effective
as smallholder production in reducing poverty because their waged employment
also lifts people in households above the poverty line.30
Concern over EUREPGAP was part of a broader concern with the impact of
developed country standards on developing country farmers. This concern was
highlighted in the report of the Commission for Africa (2005). Published in 2005,
this made explicit reference to the potential impact of private food standards on
small farmers in Kenya:
Export markets offer very lucrative opportunities but can be very hard to
exploit. Large retailers such as supermarkets in Europe play a decisive role in
structuring the production and processing of fresh vegetables exported from
Africa. The top 30 supermarket chains worldwide control almost a third of 
grocery sales. Their informal or private standards can be even more exacting
than official ones – such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) described later
in this chapter – leading to the exclusion of small farmers and concentrating
business in the hands of large firms. In 1997, approximately 70 per cent of
Kenya’s high-value horticulture export earnings were supplied by small-scale
farmers. By 2000, the need to comply with international food standards meant
this fell to 30 per cent. It is estimated that the effects of the 2005 EU food
safety regulations could cost Kenya over US$400 million annually in lost
export earnings. If African countries do not meet these standards (see 
following sections), a shift in procurement from other regions, such as Latin
America, could take place.
(Commission for Africa 2005: 265–6)
The perception of EUREPGAP as a threat to rural livelihoods and poverty reduc-
tion seems to have been based on four assumptions:
l Small farmers are less likely to have the financial resources for investment in 
new equipment, such as latrines, washing facilities and pesticide stores.
l Small farmers’ ability to adopt new techniques, such as integrated pest 
management and crop rotation, is likely to be more limited.
l Both the startup costs and the recurrent costs of certification itself would be 
relatively high for small farms – relative to the revenue from their sales and to 
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30 This argument is developed by McCulloch and Ota (2002), who modelled the impact of different 
farming systems on household poverty through a simulation exercise based on data from a survey of 
263 households in Kenya.
their capacity to make the upfront investment in systems development and 
certification.
l Small farmers tend to have less sophisticated farming systems than large 
farmers. Therefore the capacity of these farmers to meet the documentation, 
traceability and skill requirements of EUREPGAP would be less than for 
larger farmers. 
l African countries are particularly vulnerable to the development of private 
voluntary standards (and food safety standards more generally) because the 
food safety regimes are less well-developed than those in competitor 
countries.
The January 2005 deadline for EUREPGAP compliance for farmers exporting to
UK supermarkets certainly exacerbated these concerns, even though some farms
in Kenya had been certified from the late 1990s. According to a technical manager
at one of the leading exporters, its own farms began the certification process with
pre-audits in 1998 and were certified as early as 2000 (Exporter Respondent 2).
Furthermore, many farms, both large and small, had already adjusted to many of
the requirements of export buyers and EU regulations, which meant that they
were at least partly on the road to meeting EUREPGAP’s requirements. Research
by Okello and Swinton in 2003–04 (2005) verified changes in the practices of
small farmers working with exporters to meet what they refer to as ‘international
food safety standards’. Nevertheless, few farmer groups had been certified by
January 2005.
The discussion of EUREPGAP requirements in the previous section shows that
Option 2 alone would not reduce the challenge of certification. On the contrary, it
both required the adoption of new practices at the farm level and imposed 
obligations with respect to the organisation of farmer groups and the development
of a QMS. 
In the words of the person in charge of Donor Project 1, there was the sense that
donors needed to ‘do something’ and that hasty action was required if the 
marginalisation of small farmers was to be avoided. In rather more colourful 
language, the head of Donor Project 3 described the period in the second half of
2004 in terms of, ‘We were panicking about January 1st, of course. Everyone was
doing some activity. All of us were running around, panicking. We did understand
that there was going to be a deadline. We did understand that this was going to
be an important thing.’ Similarly, in May 2005, Respondent 2 from Donor Project 4
observed that ‘EUREPGAP is like a buzzword now at this moment. Everyone is
talking about it.’ This respondent went on to observe that ‘Smallholder farms, we
need them, and to support them we have to get them certified’. 
The sense of urgency was heightened by the confusion between EUREPGAP and
EU regulations applying to all produce exported to Europe. This confusion is 
illustrated by this account of 2004: 
The National Daily Nation in Kenya of Friday 7th May 2004 contained an 
article describing the difficulties that particularly smallholders would face in
complying with quality standards such as EurepGAP under the title ‘EU rules
could destroy horticulture’. The article was indicative for the confusion and
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pessimistic mood at the time over the effects of regulatory protocols of a
group of European retailers. The EurepGAP standards were to become 
compulsory for all their suppliers by January 2005 and the general perception
was that it would lead to a decline in the export of horticultural produce from
Africa to Europe and would particularly exclude small scale producers from
the export trade.
(Unknown 2006: 1–2)
Some of the agencies working in Kenya contributed to this sense of crisis.
According to both Donor 3 and Service Provider 1, one agency promoted its 
training programmes by telling farmers that they would no longer be able to sell
their produce in Europe unless they had undergone EUREPGAP training. 
Although this sense of urgency was partly based on a misunderstanding of the
distinction between the two sets of regulations that were both due to come into
effect on 1 January 2005, it was not actually misplaced – for the reasons offered
in Section 4.1. First, EUREPGAP was, in part, only implementing the practices
that the EU had made mandatory, including reduction of pesticide levels and the
introduction of traceability. The connection was made clear at Exporter 3:
In this situation here, everyone is concerned that the smallholder is going to
be marginalised with the EU regulations. This EUREPGAP is not an EU 
regulation per se. It is being driven by the retailers. The point is that EU 
regulations put the pressure on importers and puts the pressure on to the
retailer. There is a problem, they’re the ones who are going to get locked up
and they don’t want to be locked up.
(Exporter 3, Respondent 1)
Second, the main outlets for Kenyan produce were the northern European super-
markets that demanded EUREPGAP. The mistake, however, was to believe that
the small farmers that were exporting via small exporters to small retailers and
wholesale markets would be caught up in the EUREPGAP web.31
In response to the challenge as it was perceived at the time, many initiatives were
undertaken to facilitate certification. In fact, one could say that the attention given
to EUREPGAP seemed to focus donors on this issue, and in a rather paradoxical
way, the new challenge actually encouraged donors to promote new farmer
groups and increase the numbers in export horticulture. It was as if the 
certification was viewed as a sufficient rather than necessary condition of access
to EU markets. In other words, achieving certification was the main goal, and that
other challenges, such as finding an exporter willing to buy the product and 
maintaining the integrity of the quality system over time were minor issues.
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31 Asian vegetables would be one example of a product line that was distributed primarily through 
smaller retail outlets in the UK. HCDA had a programme to link small farmer groups with small 
exporters using packing facilities at its Nairobi headquarters. Products from this source also reached 
UK consumers through wholesale markets and the greengrocer shops. Neither of these sources would
require EUREPGAP.
This is the crucial point. The focus on certification as the goal led to donors fre-
quently making two errors in their framing of the problem they were addressing:
1 The goal of the donors was not, in many cases, framed in terms of integrating
small farmers and farmer groups into those horticultural export value chains 
that required EUREPGAP certification. Rather, it was framed in terms of 
making it easier for small farmers, and particularly farmer groups, to achieve 
EUREPGAP certification. A consequence of this focus on farmer groups was 
that the value chain linkages in the export horticulture business and the 
critical role played by exporters in securing access to those buyers which 
required EUREPGAP certification were not always fully appreciated, even 
though donors were much more focused on private-sector initiatives in the 
horticultural sector than they had been a decade previously. Put succinctly, 
the default position of numerous donors was to think of farmers as indepen-
dent producers linked to exporters through arm’s length market relationships, 
rather than as suppliers tightly linked to their buyers.
2 This perspective also fails to understand adequately the relationship between 
EUREPGAP as a certification, and EUREPGAP as a quality management 
system enforced through certification. Certification is not the end in itself, but 
rather verification that a quality system has been put in place. It follows from 
this that, given the complexity of the demands placed on farmers by this 
quality system and the means by which it is verified (as discussed in some 
detail in Section 4.2), the challenges for small farmers and farmer groups are 
particularly severe. It also follows that donors frequently saw the major 
obstacle as the start-up costs incurred in achieving certification – the cost of 
certification itself and the cost of new equipment and facilities. When 
EUREPGAP is characterised as a quality system operating within a value 
chain characterised by high levels of coordination, a key challenge is how to 
maintain the integrity and controllability of the quality management system, at 
the farm level and in the division of responsibilities between farmers and 
exporters. 
It also follows from this discussion that the key actors in the chain are the
exporters. A few exporters are responsible for exporting the overwhelming bulk of
fresh fruit and vegetables to those European retailers (via European importers).
Their decisions about where to source and how to source would be critical.
Furthermore, given their obligations to their customers (described in Section 4.3),
the costs and benefits of different approaches to the EUREPGAP problem would
be most likely to be viewed by them in the context of their overall business and
the options available to them, rather than in terms of the economics of the small
farmer, as will be shown below.
It will be demonstrated below that the donor framings of the problem failed to
place small farmers within the global value chains that link producers to the
European retailers that demand EUREPGAP certification and did not fully 
understand the quality management challenge. This misunderstanding of the
nature of the horticulture value chain had consequences for the success of donor
interventions.
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In the following section, examples of various different types of donor interventions
to promote small farmer inclusion into EUREPGAP-compliant production are 
outlined. After this, the strengths and weaknesses of these interventions are 
discussed from a value chain perspective. This analysis is then followed by a 
discussion of the ways in which exporters have developed strategies in response
to the challenges of meeting the EUREPGAP standard.
5.1 Donor interventions in Kenya
What is not in doubt is the extent to which donors did respond very actively to the
challenge as they saw it. In addition to initiatives funded by government agencies
from the European Union, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom
and the USA, some NGOs were involved along with institutions linked to the
Kenyan government and private sector companies. In addition, organisations such
as FPEAK (the Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya), KEPHIS (Kenya
Plant Health Inspection Services) and KEBS (Kenya Bureau of Standards) were
also actively involved in meeting the challenge of conforming to public and private
food standards in the European Union. In particular, they were involved in the
national technical committee working towards a national equivalent standard,
KenyaGAP. The richness of the local institutional environment, the importance of
aid donors for the Kenyan economy and Kenyan government, and the widely-
recognised importance of export horticulture for rural development, all came
together to create rich and varied responses to the perceived challenge of the
EUREPGAP standard.
These schemes were aimed predominantly (although not entirely) at small 
farmers, on the grounds that these farmers were at a particular disadvantage with
respect to achieving EUREPGAP certification. The range of these initiatives is
shown in Table 5.1. This is drawn entirely from publicly-available sources on the
internet. This means that it is certainly not comprehensive, and it is likely to be
biased towards interventions, donors, partner organisations and beneficiaries that
are inclined to provide information on the web. Nevertheless, the 18 initiatives in
the table do provide a good indication of the scope of activities and funders
involved in initiatives relating to EUREPGAP in 2004–06. It is a partial list:
Exporter 4 claimed that there were over 50 initiatives operating at the beginning of
2005. Similarly, in 2004 alone, Donor 3 had initiated 16 new projects involving 10
different sub-contractors in the horticulture sector. Most of these projects were
related to EUREPGAP in one way or another.32
With any donor activity on this scale, there will be problems. The most familiar
ones will be corruption – observed in at least one of the 18 cases in the table
according to the donor concerned – and lack of coordination between agencies
and inter-agency rivalry. A number of the respondents pointed to this problem.
However, the table also points to considerable inter-agency collaboration. One of
the parastatal organisations interviewed was able to point to its collaborations with
two leading exporters, the exporters’ association, FPEAK, and two of the most
active donors.
32 Further discussion of initiatives in Kenya and Uganda can be found in FAO (2006: 19–23). 
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The aim of this analysis is not to evaluate the success or failure of these projects
in terms of the issues of aid effectiveness that arise in many development 
interventions. Rather, its focus is – to repeat the argument made above – on the
ways in which the issues were framed by the many agencies involved in 
responding to the challenge of EUREPGAP and the consequences of these 
framings for the effectiveness of the interventions. As new standards and new
challenges are likely to emerge in the globalised food industry, similar challenges
are likely to arise in future, and this is why it is important to learn from the
EUREPGAP experience.
The 18 interventions listed in Table 5.1 demonstrate both the range of different
agencies involved in the response to EUREPGAP and the many different ways in
which the overall goal of facilitating access of small farmers to export markets was
addressed. It has been constructed using the extensive materials available in the
public domain (as illustrated in the table itself), recent analyses of EUREPGAP
interventions in Kenya,33 and project interviews with some of the key actors 
concerned (as specified in Appendix 1). Interventions 1–9 are mainly concerned
with developing and training farmer groups with a view to certification. The
involvement of exporting companies in these initiatives varied considerably.
Interventions 10 to 16 are mainly concerned with service provision. Interventions
17 and 18 mainly involve working with exporters.
The analysis will focus on the following issues: 
A) Some interventions were aimed at developing private sector provision of the 
support services needed for EUREPGAP. How did they contribute to 
smallholder certification?
B) Training. This was an important component of numerous interventions. How 
was it located within the broader goal of ensuring small farmer access to 
EUREPGAP-compliant export markets? 
C) Creation and operation of farmer groups. This is the basis for certification 
under Option 2. What are the implications of the QMS requirement for the 
sustainability of farmer groups?
D) The economics of EUREPGAP for small farmers. This has been the main 
focus of recent analyses of the impact of EUREPGAP on small farms. To 
what extent has the value chain perspective and the role of exporters been 
incorporated into these analyses? 
E) Exporter responses to the challenges of EUREPGAP. What have exporters 
done to make EUREPGAP more manageable and cost-effective in the context
of outgrower groups? 
33 Notably, a DFID-funded study by Graffham et al. (2007), a study carried out by researchers based at 
ICIPE (Asfaw et al. 2007; Mithöfer et al. 2007), and an evaluation of the lessons learned from 
intervention 11 in Ouma (2007).
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Table 5.1 Publicly available information on EUREPGAP 
interventions by development agencies in Kenya
P* Donor Description Source Source
1 DrumNet 1. Pride 1.Formation of farmer groups in Mount Kenya (Pride
Kenya Africa (USA) region. Project overtaken by introduction Africa
Horticultural 2. IDRC of EUREPGAP. 2005)
Exporters (Canada) 2. EUREPGAP manual translated into Kikuyu.
Limited 3. GTZ 3. Detailed training modules for the DrumNet (Ashraf
(KHE) (Germany) farmers. et al.
Farmers According to Pride Africa, ‘DrumNet, a project 2006)
of Pride Africa, was launched in late 2002 to
deliver a set of critical business support 
services directly to the African smallholder 
farmers. It is designed as marketing, financial 
and information services for mainstreaming 
resource-poor farmers’ (Pride Africa 2003).
2 KHE Kenya BDS ‘In August 2004, Kenya BDS entered into a (Kenya
avocado Program, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with BDS
growers funded by the Kenya Horticultural Exporters (KHE) to Program
USAID34 develop a commercial market linkages 2006)
program for avocado farmers … Under this 
MoU, Kenya BDS offered to mobilize and train 
avocado farmers … to form into viable 
producer groups which could enter into 
commercial win-win relationships with KHE 
as a buyer of their fruits … The second phase 
of the program started in October 2005 and 
had a target 1,000 farmers with 10,000 trees. 
During this phase, the program has worked 
with 559 farmers, organized into 25 groups 
with a total of 5,553 trees’. In a third phase of 
this programme, one of the goals specified in 
the terms of reference was ‘Total number of 
MSEs with EUREPGAP certification – 1,000.’
3 Local Kenya BDS A tender with the following outputs envisaged (Kenya
contractor was issued in 2007: BDS
‘By the end of this intervention, Kenya BDS Program
envisions that in the passion fruit sector 4 2007)
groups will have achieved EurepGAP
certification with ongoing support and 
administration from a market linkage service 
provider that oversees a functioning QMS. In 
the avocado sector, 6 groups will have 
achieved EurepGAP certification, supported 
by a network of 3 market linkage service 
providers (serving different export markets) 
that are each maintaining their own QMS. 
Most importantly, the field staff (Field Coordin-
ators and Group Management Officers) of the 
market linkage firms will have the necessary 
skills and experience to reach additional 
groups linked with their end markets. Through 
the success of the initial pilot groups, 
additional farmers will see that EurepGAP
certification is not a barrier but an opportunity.
Actual results from Phase 2 will be measured 
against specific indicators proposed by the 
facilitator, but will contain targets such as:
l 1 passion fruit QMS Manual developed and 
certified by AfriCert and adapted for 2 exporter 
production systems;
P* Partner in Kenya
34 The Kenya BDS Program is funded by USAID and managed by the Emerging Markets Group, a spin-
off from Deloitte Touche.
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l 1 avocado QMS Manual developed and 
certified by AfriCert and adapted for 3 exporter 
production systems;
l 4 smallholder passion fruit groups Eurep-
GAP certified (25 farmers per group);
l 6 smallholder avocado groups EurepGAP
certified (25 farmers per group);
l At least 250 farmers trained in the technical 
aspects of EurepGAP certification; and
l At least 5,000 farmers aware of the 
benefits derived from record-keeping, trace-
ability, and EurepGAP certification.’
4 Gatanga HDC Group applied to ‘HDC for technical assistance (HDC
Horticultural (USAID)35 and training in passion fruit agronomy, 2005)
Farmers’ EUREPGAP implementation and certification, 
Group market information and linkages in January
Myner 2004 … Achieving EUREPGAP compliance is 
Exporters a major goal of the group and as such they 
have been working with both HDC and Myner 
Exporters’.
5 Outgrowers HDC ‘Two HDC-assisted outgrowers, Janet Kajuju (Fintrac/
EAGA (USAID) and Phalis Kimaita; and two farmer associa- HDC
WONI tions, Jericho and Makena Selfhelp Groups, 2005: 3)
received EUREPGAP certification in May. All 
have marketing contracts with East African 
Growers (EAGA) who have now increased 
their list of certified outgrowers and groups to 
30. Additionally, 11 new EUREPGAP extension 
officers, recruited by WONI Exporters with 
HDC assistance, began their field work, 
having received training in all aspects of 
EUREPGAP compliance.’
EAGA and WONI are horticulture exporters.
6 CARE+ Including Provision of EUREPGAP services to farmers (Odo
Vegpro BSMDP organised in farmer groups under an earlier 2006a)
(Vegcare) CARE REAP (Rural Enterprise Agribusiness 
Promotion) project initially financed by IFAD. www.bsmdp.
‘Support on possible REAP joint Venture org
company and EurepGAP certification in 
Kibwezi’.
7 Karikoini Fintrac- Karikoini Green Growers, a group of nine (Fintrac
Green KHDP- women and 24 men located in Kenya’s Central 2006)
Growers USAID Province … were growing a variety of
Kenya traditional crops, had low yields, and were
Horticultural selling to informal markets at inconsistent
Exporters prices. In April 2005, the group began
Limited receiving assistance from Fintrac’s Kenya
(KHE) Horticultural Development Program (KHDP), 
which is funded by USAID. The group is linked 
with Kenya Horticultural Exporters Limited 
(KHE), a major supplier of fine beans and 
other fresh produce to the European market. 
Through the KHDP-KHE alliance, the group 
became EurepGAP certified in November 
2006, a major achievement that enabled sales 
of French beans into the European market. 
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35 USAID worked through a private sector company, Fintrac (www.fintrac.com). This company set up the 
Horticulture Development Centre, HDC, which runs the USAID-funded Kenyan Horticulture 
Development Programme (KHDP). Different documents from this initiative emphasise Fintrac or HDC 
or KHDP. For more information on KHDP, see Fintrac (n.d.).
8 Ministry of JICA Training of extension staff on EU regulations (Nyagah
Agriculture (Japan) and EUREPGAP: ‘sensitization and training 2007: 8)
HCDA of field extension staff from the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA) and HCDA on EU regulation 
and EUREPGAP requirements. This was done 
through training and workshops that exposed 
the staff to Quality Management Systems 
(QMS) – ISO 9000, Environmental Manage-
ment System – ISO 14000 and Social 
Accountability – SA 8000. The trained officers 
can now serve as trainers for smallholder 
farmers and internal auditors who prepare 
farmers for pre-audits. Several training and 
production manuals covering export fruits and 
vegetables were also developed and all these 
incorporated Good Agricultural Practices 
(GAPs). Subsequent to these trainings 
farmers’ groups were trained at district level 
and group secretaries trained on record 
keeping, an essential component to attain 
compliance’. 
9 Exporter – CBI ‘NAK AGRO is also active in Kenya and (NAK
information (Nether- Senegal. By order of the Dutch government 2007)
not in public lands) and the sector organization CBI (Central
domain NAK Agro Bureau for Commodities) NAK AGRO, tog-
ether with its partners in these two countries, 
carries out a project which aims to introduce 
EurepGAP at small-scale producers’. 
10 CARE+ DFID- Develop QMS manual for Option 2. (Billing
Vegpro BSMDP Vegpro is a horticultural exporter. CARE and 2007)
(Vegcare) (UK) Reach the Children are NGOs. (Agricult-
Reach the The Business Services Market Development ural 
Children Project (BSMDP) is a DFID-funded Review
programme managed by Cardiff and Vale 2007)
Enterprises. (Coates
2006)
(Odo
2006b&c)
11 Various DFID- Develop generic QMS manual for Option 2. (Billing
BSMDP 2007)
GTZ
EUREPGAP www.gtz.de/
en/praxis/
9479.htm
12 ICIPE DFID- ‘Candidates were selected from the large (ICIPE
19 farmer BSMDP number of respondents to a newspaper 2005)
groups USAID- advertisement; and each of the collaborating
KHE HDC export companies nominated one of their field (Lenné
Myner staff to participate. Training started in and Ward
Indufarms November 2003 and covers extension 2004)
Greenlands communication skills, working with farmer
groups, integrated pest management, 
safe and effective use of pesticides, hygiene 
standards for fresh produce, business 
management and EUREPGAP (Euro Retailer 
Produce Working Group for Good Agricultural 
Practice) requirements and preparation of 
outgrower groups for certification. Trainees 
attached to outgrower groups (one trainee per 
group) have been able to improve group 
organisation, linking groups with reliable 
exporters, preparation for EUREPGAP
compliance and providing services to small-
holder horticultural producers against 
payment.’
13 FreshLink DFID- Support for FreshLink as a vertical marketing (Billing
BSMDP organisation. FreshLink is a produce 2007)
marketing organisation that acts as an 
intermediary between farmers and exporters.
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14 Africert BSMDP- Support development of Africert. www.gtz.de/
DFID Africert is a local certification company, en/praxis/
GTZ originally spun off from ICIPE. 9479.htm
15 Association BSMDP BSMDP promoted and worked with ADHEK to (BSMDP
of facilitate the access of small exporters to n.d.)
Developing EUREPGAP-compliant European customers.
Horticultural ADHEK’s membership focused on the small (Agri-
Exporters exporters that used HCDA’s facilities at Nairobi business
of Kenya airport. BSMDP’s work plan included: and
(ADHEK) ‘Work with HDC and possibly Kenya BDS to Allied 
establish actual and demonstrable examples Kenya
of fully certified PMOs in the avocado and Limited
green bean sub-sectors. This may involve 2004)
working with groups already related to an 
organization of exporters like or with the more 
flexible and innovative large exporters. 
Equally, the project could identify existing 
groups which are already working towards 
certification and which could be established 
as exemplars of the process.’
‘To work with [ADHEK] to develop its 
relationship with its producer groups and to 
explore how these linkages can be strength-
ened and grown as part of the process by 
which smallholder groups can also obtain 
group compliance with export regulations and 
the EUREPGAP code of practice.’
BSMDP also supported a private sector 
organisation, Agribusiness and Allied Kenya 
Limited, whose 2004 business plan defined its 
mission as ‘To be the professional leaders in 
training and implementation of EUREPGAP
standards and ensuring continuous achieve-
ment of other market requirements and 
regulations to farmers engaged in high-value 
farm production’ (Agribusiness and Allied 
Kenya Limited 2004).
16 ICIPE USAID Training of trainers. (Nyagah
2007:
1–2)
17 Myner Pesticides ‘PIP was there to help Myner at every step of (Pesticides
Initiative the way. A protocol was signed between Initiative
Programme Myner and PIP in November 2002. That same Programme
(PIP) (EU) year a needs assessment study was carried n.d.)
out. A food safety system was implemented in
2003 and by early 2004 a computerised trace-
ability system was also in place. Also in 2004, 
the company’s technical staff and small 
growers received training on hygiene and 
traceability issues. EurepGAP pre-audits were 
also carried out that same year and certi-
fication was acquired at the end of the year. 
All these actions were conducted with PIP
support.’
PIP, founded in 2000, is managed by 
COLEACP, a non-profit making organisation 
set up by the European Commission to help 
develop the competitiveness of horticultural 
exports from ACP countries. PIP’s prog-
rammes long predate the recent concern with 
EUREPGAP, having been created in response 
to the tightening of EU regulations concerning 
pesticide residues in the 1990s. A roundtable 
on the pesticides initiative was held as early 
as June 2000 in Nairobi.
18 Homegrown PIP Homegrown has received training for its (Lenné
smallholders and its technical staff through and Ward
PIP. 2004)
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5.2 Promoting business services
Promoting the development of business services and providing training to small
farmers can be considered to be the opposite ends of the intervention spectrum.
One targets small farmers directly, and the other focuses on the overall business
environment and the provision of specialist services for agricultural development.
This sub-section looks at service provision, and the following one focuses on
training of farmers. 
Table 5.1 identifies seven initiatives related to various aspects of service provision
(interventions 10–16). Work in this area was led by two pre-existing donor 
programmes for promoting business services: the DFID-funded Business Services
Management Development Programme (BSMDP) and the USAID-funded
Business Development Services Program (BDS). In both cases, EUREPGAP
became the focus of some, but not all, of their work. The BDS defines its 
programme in more general terms:
Specifically, the program will select subsectors of high growth potential for
MSEs, and identify market inefficiencies along the value-chain. As critical 
constraints are identified, the program will facilitate the delivery of appropriate
business services to rural MSEs on a commercial basis.36
As can be seen from the BDS website, it did work directly with small farmers and
exporters, and it worked both directly and through the development of service
providers, to identify and eliminate value chain inefficiencies.
The BSMDP also promoted a wide range of initiatives, focusing on EUREPGAP
as it became evident that it would be important for market access: ‘findings [other
study commissioned in 2001 on green beans] led to a change in focus [of the 
horticulture programme] from only green beans to all export vegetables and an
implementation strategy development designed to ensure small holder producers
are maintained in the export value chain, and focused on in the identification of
interventions that address issues related to EurepGAP’.37 These included 
promoting a local CB by cooperating with a leading local institution, ICIPE, to spin
out its expertise on certification into an independent company, Africert. This was
seen as a means of reducing the cost of certification, which up to that point
depended upon certification companies from Europe or South Africa. However,
some UK supermarkets insisted on specifying particular certification companies,
and this was a particular constraint for companies auditing simultaneously for
EUREPGAP and TNC. 
In addition to this, BSMDP promoted smaller exporters and other local service
companies. One of these initiatives is summarised in item 15 in Table 5.1. ADHEK
is an association of medium-sized exporters supported by a DFID BSMDP
programme. The same programme also promoted Agribusiness and Allied Kenya
Limited, whose 2004 business plan defined its mission as ‘To be the professional
leaders in training and implementation of EUREPGAP standards and ensuring
36 www.kenyabds.com, program overview
37 http://bsmdp.org/winner.asp?pcat=subsectors&cat=exportsector&sid=117.
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continuous achievement of other market requirements and regulations to farmers
engaged in high-value farm production’ (Agribusiness and Allied Kenya Limited
2004). Seven different horticulture initiatives, all relating in one way or another to
EUREPGAP are listed on the website.38
While these interventions are not always directly focused on small farmers, they
do seek to enhance the possibility of small farmer incorporation into EUREPGAP-
compliant value chains. By promoting the development of independent service
suppliers, they also point to the possibility of de-linking small farmers from 
particular exporters. If many of the support services for farmer groups could be
provided by such independent service suppliers, then it might be possible to 
support farmer groups that could, in principle, work with one or more exporters.
This issue will be considered further in Section 6.3 below. 
Service promotion did, however, face two challenges. The first came from the
donors themselves. By subsidising the services offered to smallholders in order to
reduce the costs of certification, and also by bringing in ‘experts’ from their home
countries, some donors undermined the local market for EUREPGAP-related 
services. The second came from the exporters. Exporters expanding EUREPGAP-
certified production were in the market for qualified local staff. According to one
local service company: 
BSMDP and BDS are business service creation – and that, therefore, is not
direct assistance to getting people through EUREPGAP. They are creating
service providers who will then go through EUREPGAP. [A donor] has put
quite a lot of money into training individuals as service providers. As soon as
they’ve been trained, they get snapped up by the exporter companies as
employees ... These export companies will come and grab them and say, ‘you
have a permanent job’.
(Service provider 1)
These service provision initiatives may increase the local stock of knowledge, but
it is less clear whether they will create the potential for independent service 
suppliers. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the services are required by
those exporters that are linked into the supply chains of the European retailers
that require EUREPGAP.
5.3 Knowledge gaps and training
Training is clearly essential for farmers that are going to be incorporated into
EUREPGAP-compliant production, whether as individual farmers under Option 1
or as part of a farmer group in Option 2. Training initiatives were widespread.
Farmers in groups supplying Service Provider 5, for example, reported having
received one-day training courses in record-keeping, pest management, storage
and handling, hygiene, group management, fertiliser application, farming 
techniques and knowledge about EUREPGAP, although not all the farmers 
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38 http://bsmdp.org/winner.asp?pcat=subsectors&cat=exportsector&sid=118.
interviewed had taken all these courses. Financial support for this Exporter’s
development of farmer groups was provided by Donor 3. Training (both for 
farmers and for technical staff) was also the focus of the PIP initiative. Although
this programme had been developed to address EU regulations rather than
EUREPGAP specifically (one respondent suggested that the term ‘EUREPGAP’
had to be avoided in approaches to PIP), it was used by exporters, as indicated
by projects 17 and 18 in Table 5.1.
The intervention most clearly focused on training was the collaboration between
JICA and HCDA (project 8), focused on the training of trainers (extension officers)
and the training of the secretaries of farmers groups in order to reach farmers in
farmers groups. One estimate of the reach of this programme was that it was 
possible to reach 1,507 groups and 45,000 farmers. Another estimate supplied by
a respondent in Kenya suggested that 2,500 farmers were trained. According to
Service Provider 5, the training took place over three days, with farmers being
paid to attend, but there was no further follow-up. These interventions were
accompanied by a translation of materials into the local language to facilitate 
training. This was done by JICA and also in the case of the IDRC-funded 
translation of the EUREPGAP manual (project 1). 
Training was also the initial focus of the work of Donor 4. According to
Respondent 2 from this donor, who was interviewed when the company hired for
the work was making its initial scoping visit to Kenya, the goal of this intervention
was to train 500 farmers. The intervention was to be limited to this. Subsequently,
the focus of this intervention changed, and much greater emphasis was put on
working with an exporter in Kenya and developing an innovative approach to the
challenges of securing certification for farmer groups.
There is no doubt that training of small farmers is attractive to donors. It reaches
the target beneficiaries directly and is well targeted to the rural poor, who are a
priority group for the overall donor goal of reducing poverty and achieving the
MDG poverty reduction goal. One service provider highlighted the way in which
training and consultancy were priorities for the donors:
The problem is, everybody focuses on training and consultancy. If I come up
with a budget for EUREPGAP, there can be 6 million [Kenyan shillings] to
training and consultancy, no questions asked. But if I put in 300,000, for
example for a 40 foot container which we convert into a grading shed and a
water tank on a concrete slab, it’s a big issue. They can’t fund it. I don’t need
a consultant for £650 per day to talk to 30 smallholders about EUREPGAP.
Plenty of people can do that. Biochemical [experts] come for free to train our
farmers. And this is more or less the issue. Consultancy, no problem, 
everybody will empty their pockets, because there’s plenty of money. But
when it comes to a proper infrastructural input, you can’t do it.
(Exporter 5)
The shortcomings of training lie in two areas. The first is that providing farmers
with some knowledge about EUREPGAP is not the same as providing them with
the equipment, procedures and techniques to meet the standard. As was shown in
Section 3.2, the standard is set out as a series of control points. Translating 
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information about these control points and introducing them to farmers is neither
sufficient nor necessary for EUREPGAP certification. On the one hand, training in
this area does not provide the knowledge and resources to implement the rules
and procedures laid down by EUREPGAP. For example, being provided with the
information that the EUREPGAP auditor will check to see ‘whether or not the
choice of crop protection products has been made by a competent person, 
indicated through records as to the person making the choice and documentation
of the person’s qualification or training’ is a long way from being able to implement
this requirement. Who will train the competent person? How will records be kept
of both this person’s activity and his/her qualifications? On the other hand, in a
well-managed system (managed by an exporter, a produce marketing organisation
or the management of a farmer cooperative), people and procedures could be put
in place to ensure that a competent person (or persons) is available to scout fields
and identify problems, decide on the course of action and use the appropriate
crop protection products. The farmer would not necessarily have to make any
decisions on these issues.
The second major problem relates to the link between the farmers in groups being
trained and export markets. Donor 5 had through its previous interventions 
provided resources which had enabled small exporters to access parts of the
European market. These small exporters were able to hire facilities for packing on
a daily basis, and the donor’s Kenyan partner had a programme to link them with
small farmer groups. This rather effectively increased the access of exporters and
farmers to segments of the European market not targeted by the larger exporters.
However, these segments of the European market did not require EUREPGAP.
Therefore, even if the scheme had been successful in enabling farmer groups to
obtain EUREPGAP certification, it would have substantially increased farmer
costs, without necessarily providing access to the export market segments that
required EUREPGAP. In other words, even if successful, the scheme would have
created additional costs without any obvious additional benefit. 
Other initiatives that have focused on training have avoided some of these 
problems by linking directly with exporters and training either farmers in exporter
outgrower schemes, or exporter staff who will then implement EUREPGAP.
Initiatives 2, 3, 4, 9 and 12 in Table 5.1 fall into this category.
Nevertheless, the challenges associated with developing farmer groups turned out
to be substantial (as will be discussed further below). Realistically, EUREPGAP
training becomes intensive and focused on relatively small groups, rather than
extending to large numbers of farmers. One of the people involved in a project
listed in the table argued subsequently in a reflection on rural producers in the
context of globalisation and supply chain integration that:
Niche markets are usually highly specified markets with potentially high 
margins and relatively dynamic elasticity of demand (fashion or longer term
trend?). Yet, from the development perspective training farmer, traders and
processors on quality production and handling has a poor cost-benefit ratio:
relatively few people are finally highly specialised under relatively high costs.
(Höffler 2007: 1)
This conundrum will be considered further below.
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5.4 Support for the development of farmer groups
Given the importance of farmer groups for Option 2 certification, one of the ways
that donors pursued their overall goals of rural development and poverty reduction
was to try to facilitate the entry of new farmer groups into export production. In
some cases, these farmer groups were formed with the support of local and 
international NGOs and then supported by donors. In other cases, they involved
reorienting existing farmer groups to EUREPGAP production. To what extent were
the challenges facing farmer groups in the context of EUREPGAP correctly 
understood? In particular, were the challenges arising from the implementation of
a quality management system (QMS) (as outlined in Section 4.2) and the 
maintenance of system integrity fully appreciated and addressed? 
Farmer groups existed in Kenya prior to the introduction of EUREPGAP, both
linked to exporters and as independent groups. For example, the groups formed
by HCDA linked to smaller exporters (mentioned above) pre-dated any concern
with EUREPGAP. However, EUREPGAP created new challenges. The first, and
most obvious one, was that in order to qualify for Option 2, group certification, the
group had to be a legal entity that could enter into a contractual arrangement with
an exporter. Legal status was, however, only the first requirement. The groups
also needed to function effectively, and here EUREPGAP placed demanding new
requirements. In particular, the QMS system depended upon the capacity of the
group to maintain group discipline, while EUREPGAP system integrity required
the maintenance of a control system that would satisfy the exporters’ needs.
Problems arose in both of these areas.
The development of a farmer group QMS was itself a challenge. For some people
in the industry, this could only be achieved with the help of the exporters:
The key thing that the exporters provided is the knowledge of how to get
through EUREPGAP. Outgrower groups in [various districts of Kenya] just
would not know how to go about getting EUREPGAP qualified. Now, I have a
view that it is only the exporter and/or people like ourselves [service
providers] who can get a group through. I think it all revolves around the
exporter. No disrespect to the Ministry of Agriculture or HCDA, they cannot
provide the immediacy, the knowledge, the current commercial information to
get a group through EUREPGAP.
(Service Provider 1)
This view reinforces the importance of the initiatives around service provision.
Without such initiatives, the process would be completely in the hands of the
exporters.
Donor interventions did, generally speaking, address the knowledge and capacity
issues facing farmer groups. There is less evidence that the implications of
EUREPGAP for group discipline were fully understood. Across the different
donors, there were two approaches to the promotion of farmer groups for EUREP-
GAP. The first was to focus on the maintenance of existing exporter farmer groups
in the export business. Given pre-existing pressures towards the marginalisation
of small farmers and the role of outgrower groups as the bedrock of small farmer
export production, just preserving existing levels of small farmer exports was a
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challenge. The second approach was to support the creation of new groups and
draw them into export horticulture. In part, this was because EUREPGAP was
being seen as an opportunity rather than a threat – in effect, as a sufficient 
condition for access to this market, rather than a necessary one. In part, it was
because some donors saw working with exporters as excluding other small 
farmers. In the words of Donor 4, Respondent 2, ‘I know we’ve been told that we
should work through the exporters, but on the other hand, because it’s been said
that the exporters have their own little niche, then what happens to the others?’
In either approach, the challenge is to create groups that can enforce discipline.
The QMS requirement is not simply that a system is in place, but that the group
enforces it through discipline – a point expressed powerfully by Service 
Provider 2:
The group must have discipline. You have a manual by which you are going
to manage your group. In other words, what you do with the individual grower,
grower Z, who doesn’t obey your rules, who sprays an illegal pesticide, who
breaks your rules. Each group must not only meet the EUREPGAP standard,
but they must have their own code of practice by which they run their group.
So it is actually, I think, is more difficult to go through EUREPGAP certification
as a group, because you then also have to have this code of practice that is
run by the group. The group has to be strong enough to implement their code
of practice and have the discipline and to understand why they have to have
a code of practice…
Everyone joins a group, because someone comes along and says it’s a great
idea, but then when the crunch comes, they have to stick by the letter of the
law, i.e. by this code of practice, there’s quite likely to be a high wastage 
within the group because they’ll have to throw people out. 
On this point, there was broad agreement about the problems involved in creating
and maintaining farmer groups. Donor 5, respondent 2 referred to ‘group 
dynamics’: ‘They come together, they are very happy but after a time they start
fighting – for leadership and all these things. Some of them, they agree and 
continue performing well. But others break completely.’ Donor 2 referred to the
failure to emphasise leadership training for groups, and the evaluation of the QMS
Manual project highlighted the importance of group dynamics (Ouma 2007: 33).
Groups that are subordinated to exporters, which can offer a secure outlet for their
produce but which can also threaten expulsion, may find it easier to keep group
discipline.
The issue of discipline is also important for controlling side-selling. Once again,
this has been a long-established and widespread problem in outgrower schemes.
Although exporters frequently criticised outgrowers for doing this (it was a 
complaint raised explicitly by Exporters 3, 4 and 7), it is also something that some
exporters, including some of those who complain about it, sometimes encourage.
The basic logic of side selling is well-known. If exporters running outgrower
schemes provide seed, fertiliser, etc., and also provide a fixed year-round price,
then farmers have an incentive to sell produce to other buyers when the spot
price is higher than the fixed-price. This is inconvenient for the exporters. But with
EUREPGAP, the stakes are raised much higher. On the one hand, the investment
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by exporters in farmer groups is greater (discussed further in Section 6 below),
and the losses from side-selling higher. On the other hand, the integrity of the 
system is compromised if, when the spot price is lower than the fixed-price, 
farmers sell produce from non-certified sources as though it were their own. As
highlighted by Exporter 5:
You don’t need to own anything to become an exporter [referring to the 
phenomenon of briefcase exporters] ... That mentality is still here, and as long
as it’s here, the smallholder will always have the temptation to buy from 
outside when other farmers do not have a market, which is more dangerous
even than in selling outside. When he sells outside, I might lose my orders for
that week. But when he’s buying from outside he makes extra money
because his neighbour doesn’t have a market, and I am still there to collect.
But in the meantime, his neighbour has not sprayed the right chemicals and
I’m going to be in trouble when I do my MRL testing.
Similarly, the Kenyan counterpart of Donor 5 emphasised how much the side-
selling mentality was prevalent in groups and how attempts to control this were
one of the causes of friction within the groups. 
Exporters tend to manage this problem by keeping track of the quantities of seeds
issued and the yields from different plots. Given the need for continuity of 
production, farmer groups will be continually planting and picking on a 12-week
cycle for green beans. The records for each block (the sub-unit of an outgrower’s
farm which is planted at the same time), when compared to other blocks will 
indicate outlining yields that may indicate side-selling or side-buying.
In other words, these problems can be limited through exporter controls. However,
these controls eat up resources. This leads on directly to the issue of the 
economics of EUREPGAP certification for small farmers.
6 The economics of EUREPGAP 
certification for small farmers and
farmer groups 
The economics of EUREPGAP certification in Kenya, particularly as it applies to
small farmers, has been the focus of a number of recent studies. The concerns of
donors about marginalisation of small farmers have led to studies of the cost of
small farmer and farmer group certification being commissioned by some of the
donors involved in Kenya. These focus mainly on the cost of small farm and group
certification, the extent to which these costs are borne by exporters and donors,
and the financial viability of small farms. The results of two of these studies are
discussed in Section 6.1. We will argue that the economics of EUREPGAP need
to be viewed from the exporter perspective, which provides a very different view of
both the nature of the costs involved and how they might affect decisions about
who produces fresh vegetables exported from Kenya. This discussion is taken up
in Section 6.2. 
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6.1 Recent studies of the costs of EUREPGAP certification
Two recently published analyses of the economic implications of EUREPGAP
have attempted to quantify the costs of compliance and their impact on farm
incomes. The first of these reports was commissioned by DFID. A four-country
study undertaken by Graffham, Karehu and MacGregor (2007) examined the
introduction of smallholder EUREPGAP schemes by 11 exporters in Kenya,
including all of the largest Kenyan horticultural exporters. It provided a detailed
analysis of the costs involved for introducing EUREPGAP schemes for small 
farmers, covering both the start-up costs for introducing EUREPGAP and the
recurrent costs of maintaining schemes beyond their first year. It examined the
cost levels and the sources of finance for these costs – farmers themselves,
exporters and donors.
The second study was carried out by researchers based at ICIPE in Kenya (Asfaw
et al. 2007; Mithöfer et al. 2007) with collaboration from the University of Hanover.
It also focused on the costs of introducing EUREPGAP, sampling a total of 539
small farmers in five districts of Kenya. The sample was divided between farmers
supplying the domestic market, export farmers not certified and export farmers
who were either already certified, or working to certification. In addition to these
groups, the survey also looked at 18 contract farmers and eight farms belonging
to exporters. The study focused as much on the characteristics of farms that
adopted, or did not adopt, EUREPGAP as on the costs of adoption.
The findings of these reports with respect to costs are mostly consistent and can
be summarised as follows:
l The costs of introducing EUREPGAP are substantial, although they vary 
significantly from exporter to exporter. Graffham et al. (2007: 21) find 
variations in the cost per farm of different schemes ranging from £100 per 
farm to £2,800 per farm. These variations are partly the result of different 
scales: schemes involving more farmers reduce the per farm cost, and the 
cost per farm reduces substantially when more than 50 growers are involved 
(2007: 26). However, it seems likely that in addition to inconsistencies in the 
way that companies calculate costs there were also substantial differences 
between the preparedness of different exporters. Exporters with highly 
organised outgrower schemes would already have had in place many of the 
elements required for EUREPGAP, and this point will be discussed further 
below.
l The extent of donor support for initial costs varied very substantially between 
exporters, ranging from 100 per cent of the initial costs of one scheme to 0 
per cent for others. Across 10 exporters, donor support for initial costs 
averaged 20 per cent. The farmers themselves contributed 36 per cent and 
the exporters 44 per cent (Graffham et al. 2007: 20).
l As might be expected, donor support focused more on start-up costs. The 
Graffham et al. study found no donor support for recurrent costs. These were 
divided between exporters and farmers. In fact, exporters covered 86 per cent
of these costs, and in eight cases for which data is available, exporters 
covered all these costs in three of them (2007: 23).
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l Notwithstanding the high level of exporter contributions to recurrent costs, 
these still represent a substantial burden for small farmers. Graffham et al.
calculate that the true cost per farm of small farmer certification is over 
£1,000, and that the 36 per cent of total cost contributed, on average, by 
farmers works out at £433. They further calculate that this initial investment 
would have to be financed out of a production margin for small farmers of 
only £182 per annum (before labour costs). Similarly, Asfaw et al. found that 
the initial cost per group member for EUREPGAP, together with the recurrent 
cost came to one third of farmers’ annual income even when exporters and 
donors paid for substantial costs such as external auditing, certification, 
training and soil analysis (2007: 12). 
l These findings lead Graffham et al. to the conclusion that the financial viability
of EUREPGAP is marginal and that without substantial initial subsidy, it would
be impossible for farmers to be financially viable. Financial viability is very 
sensitive to both the share of initial costs borne by farmers and future 
variations in recurrent costs. 
l The ICIPE study compared farmer groups and larger farms. It found that, 
even with substantial support from exporters and donors, the break-even 
period for small farmer investments in EUREPGAP was three years, 
compared to one month for exporter farms and 12 months for large 
contracted farms (Mithöfer et al. 2007: 4). Second, there are substantial 
differences in the incidence of recurrent costs for the different types of farms. 
The time spent on monitoring was 3.5 hours per week per acre for farmer 
groups, compared to only 0.1 hours per week per acre for large contracted 
farmers (Mithöfer et al. 2007: 5). So, EUREPGAP reduced the cost advantage
that small farmers are generally held to possess in the production of fresh 
vegetables, particularly green beans.
l Both of the studies cited point to some positive outcomes for small farmers of 
the introduction of EUREPGAP. Some costs are reduced, particularly those 
relating to reduced pesticide application. Furthermore, there are clear gains 
with respect to health and safety of both farmers and family members. 
This perception of the cost burden of compliance with EUREPGAP and the lack of
capacity of farmers to meet it was the driving force behind various donor 
initiatives. Donor 2, for example, financed one project with the following subsidy
elements:
l Donor financing of risk assessment and manuals.
l Cost of training guides split equally between donor and exporter.
l Training the trainers programme paid by donor.
l Facilities development cost split equally between farmer and exporter.
l Three audit costs financed half by donor and half by exporter.
l Soil and water analysis paid by donor.
l Certification course paid by donor, except for the auditor’s transportation costs
which were paid by the exporter.
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But the evidence available by late 2006 showed that existing outgrower schemes
were under pressure. Graffham et al.’s analysis of 10 exporters showed a sharp
decline in small farmer groups, as shown in Table 6.1. The authors describe this
decline in the following terms:
In 2003 when EUREPGAP implementation started, the exporters sourced 
produce from 9,342 SSGs [small-scale growers] … By 2006, 60 per cent of
these growers had been dropped by their exporter because of problems with
implementation of EUREPGAP. Of the 40 per cent of SSGs retaining access
to EU retail markets, 31 per cent [of the 40 per cent] had been certified for
EUREPGAP. 15 per cent of the farms that have obtained EUREPGAP
certification have since been dumped by their exporter as the costs of 
maintaining certification were not matched by the level of income from 
produce obtained by these growers.
(Graffham et al. 2007: 43)
Table 6.1 Summary data on small-scale growers (SSGs) excluded
from EU retail markets due to the implementation of
EUREPGAP, Kenya
Source: Graffham et al. (2007: 42).
Although there is a substantial variation between exporters, the three exporters
with the largest number of small-scale growers appear to have substantially cut
back, and overall only 1,187 out of 9,342 growers were certified by 2006 (over a
year after the January 2005 deadline). More intriguingly, the certified small-scale
growers constituted less than one third of the total number of small-scale growers
still working for the exporters.
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Exporter SSGs prior toEUREPGAP SSGs in 2006
Certified SSGs
in 2006 SSGs dropped
1 750 750 750 0
2 1,180 300 40 880
3 400 14 0 386
4 360 360 0 0
5 107 33 33 74
6 605 237 126 368
7 500 170 18 400
8 4,000 2,000 200 2,000
9 1,200 73 0 1,127
10 240 0 20 240
Total 9,342 3,937 1,187 5,475
These problems do not show that group formation is impossible. A series of 19
case studies of farmers accessing export was produced by WRENmedia in 2007
(2007). These are based on studies originally produced for the Kenyan media and
financed by DFID with the objective of stimulating good agricultural practice and
good media coverage. However, it is worth noting that many of these case studies
are either of individual farms or of farmer groups linked to leading exporters,
including the case of Karikoini Greens, which is item 7 in Table 5.1. 
Many problems with farmer group initiatives are described by Graffham et al.
(2007), who point to a number of incidences of group failure, highlighting the
extent of the risks involved. Some of them relate to the issues described in 
previous sections – lack of markets for groups, difficulties in forming groups,
groups being too large, etc. However, it is also possible to find evidence of 
expansion of outgrower schemes. In 2006, Exporter 2, for example, was 
developing new, certified farmer groups because of a demand from UK customers
for EUREPGAP-certified passion fruit. Given that the UK supermarkets definitely
wanted to meet this demand, but only from EUREPGAP-certified farmers, the
exporter was under pressure to meet this demand as part of the overall package
of products it was supplying. It did so with some support from Donor 2 for quality
management. 
Developments such as these mean that the data presented in Table 6.1 should be
treated with caution. There may be information issues: the exit of farmers groups
from export value chains may be easier to document than the entry of new
groups. At the same time, this data does not seem to accord with views on the
ground in Kenya about continuing expansion of small farm horticulture production
and overall expansion of horticulture exports. There is a gap between data on 
limited certification and expanding output. This may be explained by a shift to 
larger farmers – including a shift towards larger ‘small-scale farmers’ that lease
land from their neighbours – but this is not clear. An alternative explanation is that
exporters continue to sell produce that is not EUREPGAP-certified, and it should
be noted that EUREPGAP retailer members are free to sell non-certified produce. 
The underlying logic of inclusion and exclusion should be considered from a value
chain perspective. It is quite possible to explain why Table 6.1 shows exclusion
from export value chains at the same time as some exporters were scrambling to
find outgrowers and develop new schemes. A value chain perspective on the
introduction and maintenance of process-based food safety standards would 
suggest a different perspective on these calculations about where donors should
offer subsidies and the extent of the cost burden facing farmers. Farmers are not
independent small producers looking to sell their products in a free market. For
the products produced to the EUREPGAP standard, they are part of a highly
organised value chain. This has implications for cost calculations presented
above.
6.2 The value chain logic of certification costs: the central role of
exporters
From the previous section it is clear that there are substantial costs involved in
meeting the requirements of EUREPGAP. These costs appear to be significant for
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small farmers, and so much so that without some form of subsidy their business
becomes unprofitable. However, we will argue that both the academic and policy-
maker analyses of the impact of EUREPGAP tend to view small farmers as if they
were independent small producers. As a result, the cost comparisons are largely
based on the perspective of the farmer as the business unit. We will argue that
once small farmers are placed in the context of horticulture value chains, a 
different set of comparisons are warranted. The problems found with the existing
comparisons are summarised in Table 6.2. Three sets of issues are raised, and
they will be discussed in turn.
Table 6.2 Impact assessment and comparisons used for EUREPGAP
6.2.1 What are the correct comparators for EUREPGAP costs?
The first issue raised in Table 6.2 relates to the basis on which cost calculation
should be made. Both of the studies cited in the previous section calculate the
impact of EUREPGAP by comparing expenditure with farmers’ gross margins or
revenues. To varying degrees, the analyses discussed in the previous section take
as their starting point (implicitly or explicitly) the individual small farmer who now
needs EUREPGAP certification in order to supply the exporters that sell to 
supermarkets in key North European markets.39 This implicitly assumes that the
key decision is whether or not farmers find it profitable to meet the EUREPGAP
standard. Asfaw et al. characterised the problem in terms of small farmers 
deciding whether or not to adopt the standard: ‘Faced with high cost of 
1. What are the relevant
cost calculations for 
the introduction of 
EUREPGAP?
A. When considering the initial and recurrent costs
of EUREPGAP at the farm level, and cal-
culating the impact of these costs, what should 
be the comparator for total cost? Is it relative to
the farmer’s costs and income, or should the 
calculation be made with respect to the 
exporter’s costs?
B. When calculating the costs of implementing 
EUREPGAP, what level of preparedness 
should be assumed? Is the process to be 
characterised as introducing EUREPGAP into 
groups of farms already integrated into exporter
or outgrower schemes, or to independent small
farmers starting from scratch? 
2. Initial and recurrent 
costs?
Because EUREPGAP is based on certification,
attention is frequently focused on the cost of certifi-
cation, particularly audit costs. However, this is only
a small part of the total cost of running a scheme.
3. Absolute or relative 
costs of certification 
for small farmers?
The real issue for small farmers is the relative cost
and the availability of produce from large farms. If
exporters want to stay in business, the key decision
is who to source from.
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compliance and complexity of the standard, farmers examine the perceived bene-
fits vis-à-vis the expected cost before making a decision to adopt the standard’
(2007: 2).
However, it was argued in Section 4.3 that leading exporters would lose their main
customers if they failed to provide them with EUREPGAP-certified produce.
Equally, for Exporter 1, Respondent 1, the EUREPGAP requirement was a 
competitive advantage that would enable the company to gain market share. This
means that from the point of view of the exporters, who were the key decision-
makers in the Kenyan part of the value chain, the choices were:
A. Stay in the EUREPGAP segment of the market, or exit it (targeting other 
markets or exiting the fruit and vegetables business altogether).
B. If staying in, work out the lowest-cost means of reliably satisfying the 
customers’ requirements.
In 2004–05 the incidence of costs was not clear to the donors, and possibly not to
the exporters, either. Donor 6, Respondent 2, for example, argued strongly that
the main cost that the farmers could not meet was the cost of certification itself.
Training could be provided by government agencies and by donors, but small
farmers were completely unable to pay for the certification costs. 
The real mistake, however, which is evident in the research on EUREPGAP, is to
see the many costs associated with EUREPGAP as falling onto the farmer and
calculating the viability of continued production by reference to the farm as the
unit of production. If exporters choose Option B above (continue exporting), then
the issue for them is not the absolute cost of smallholder compliance in relation to
total smallholder costs that is the issue, but rather the cost in relation to the 
profitability of the whole export business. The acceptance by exporters of the 
burden of recurrent costs is evidenced by the data provided by Graffham et al.
(2007). This showed that 80 per cent of these costs were born by the exporters.
This could be taken to imply that donors should not be concerned with such costs.
This issue will be discussed further below. 
The second issue relating directly to costs is the extent to which the cost of
achieving EUREPGAP should be calculated on the basis of a small farm(er) 
without prior preparation or equipment for meeting the standard. Any discussion of
the impact of these costs has to make some form of implicit or explicit comparison
with an alternative scenario. Such comparisons frequently take one of two forms:
(i) before and after, where an inter-temporal comparison shows the impact of the
shift to certification, and (ii) with and without, which compares one group to which
the policy applies, and another group to which it does not. 
These comparisons end up calculating the full costs of meeting the EUREPGAP
‘from scratch’, including changing farming practices, capital investments, 
investments in control systems and the costs of maintaining the system (annual
39 While exporters may not export solely to these customers, they tend to avoid operating certified and 
non-certified production systems in parallel. It increases flexibility if production can be switched 
between customers.
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certification and the daily cost of monitoring, control and form filling). However, the
extent of the cost depends upon where farms started in the quality assurance
process. What is the baseline?
In some circumstances, this comparison may be more appropriate. The case of
new farmer groups developed for passion fruit, cited above, would be an example.
Even here, however, the logic is UK supermarkets definitely wanted to meet this
demand, while achieving the desired level of confidence that the product would be
free of pesticides. For this, they would have to find a supplier. The exporter would
take on the business if it were profitable (or if it was imposed as an obligation
linked to continuing to supply a broader range of products) and make a deal with
growers designed to ensure their commitment. In other words, the famers’ costs
are an issue for the exporter, not the farmer – unless, as suggested above, it is
possible to source from large farmers. 
Nevertheless, for exporter outgrower groups, the correct comparison would be 
different. An exporter might have existing farmer groups producing green beans,
for which the costs will relate to the upgrading of a set of producers that are
already used to meeting export demands and incorporated into the exporter’s 
procedures (the exporter will have been under pressure for a number of years to
cut down on pesticide residues and demonstrate compliance with supermarket
standards), while in other cases (as in the case of passion fruit) completely new
groups of farmers will have to be incorporated into the export value chain. 
Tightened European safety standards were evident in the 1990s, and well-
managed outgrower schemes were a feature of export horticulture at that time.
The extent of control by exporters over small farmers was highlight by Dolan et al.
(1999) in research carried out in 1997–98. Exporters would have built on these
schemes. According to a senior manager in one of Kenya’s largest exporters
(Exporter 3, Respondent 1), interviewed in May 2005, the introduction of EUREP-
GAP required only limited changes in practices. Prior to January 2005, the 
company had already integrated its outgrowers into the private standards of two
UK supermarkets, Tesco Nature’s Choice (TNC) and Marks & Spencer’s field to
fork programme. 
Not only were these company standards more stringent, but there was 
considerable overlap between the standards and EUREPGAP. In the case of
TNC, the overlap is so great (estimated by Exporter 1 to be 90 per cent) that 
certification for both TNC and EUREPGAP are carried out simultaneously at both
Exporter 1 and Exporter 3. In the case of Exporter 3, all of the various codes to
which it was compliant (not only EUREPGAP, but also the Ethical Trade Initiative,
ISO 14,001, etc.) were incorporated into a code of practice for outgrowers. The
contracts with small farmers included a 35-page manual.
Further evidence of this preparedness is provided by a study by Okello and
Swinton (2005), which examines the adoption of international food safety 
standards on two Kenyan farms – one ‘large’ (10 hectares) and one ‘small’ (0.5
hectares). The larger farm supplies the exporter directly, while the smaller farm is
part of a farmer group established in 1999 and consisting of 31 farmers in 2004
(Okello and Swinton 2005: 16–19). Based on fieldwork in Kenya in 2003–04, it
shows that many of the mechanisms needed for EUREPGAP were already in
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place – partly because exporters had been preparing for this in advance, and
partly because these mechanisms were needed to meet buyer standards and EU
standards irrespective of EUREPGAP. This reinforces the point that EUREPGAP
was a formalisation by some supermarkets in the EU of the systems that they
already need to be in place to ensure that they would not fall foul of EU food 
safety legislation. Already in 2003–04, there was a substantial gap between the
facilities of farmers working with the more established exporters and those that
only have informal arrangements with exporters (Okello and Swinton 2005: 21). 
6.2.2 Initial and recurrent costs
Nevertheless, compliance with EUREPGAP standards means additional costs,
particularly for supervising small farmers. Not all the donors perceived the 
importance of these costs. Donor 5, Respondent 2, focused solely on the costs of
certification, arguing that other costs, such as training, were being covered by
local institutions and donors. For the exporters, however, the costs involved in
running outgrower schemes were clear. One of the managers of the outgrower
scheme at Exporter 3 described the need for increased resources in the field:
Because of the amount of pressure that compliance is putting on the 
manager, we have had to get a new role, assistant supervisors. Their main
role is just to ensure that the farm is actually complying. We realise that the
supervisors in the regions cannot handle both production and the right 
volumes coming through and at the same time ensure that the farmers are
actually complying. So, we have an assistant whose main role is just going
out there and ensuring that farmers are complying to the various standards.
(Exporter 3, Respondent 2)
Although this exporter had successfully certified its approximately 1,000 small
farmers, the supervisory costs of maintaining the scheme were substantial:
l The number of internal auditors had increased from one person to four.
l The number of technical assistants operating in the regions had increased 
from 23 to 72.
l Nine new technical managers and nine new assistant supervisory posts had 
been created.
In addition to the salary costs of these new employees, the company also had to
invest in training and transport. The company estimated that the four auditors
alone were consuming over 3,000 litres of petrol per month in their travels. This
increasing level of monitoring and supervision was needed for an almost constant
quantity of outgrowers. The key factor in this greatly increased labour input was
the need for continual monitoring, which was a recurrent cost.
A similar level of increased investment was evident in Exporter 2. The outgrower
department had grown from six agronomists to 60 people, ‘just to police the 
system on an almost daily basis’. The average farmer group consisted of 30 
farmers. One technical assistant and one quality-control person was assigned to
cover for such groups. In addition, an agronomist would be responsible for
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between 8–14 technical assistants. Continued input was required, partly because
the standards themselves continue to evolve and partly because continued 
monitoring was required to maintain standards. In the words of this respondent,
‘What we have noticed is that it takes about 90 days to train farmers, but if you
leave them for a month they go back to the old system. The system needs 
continuity’ (Exporter 2, Respondent 1).
The increased burden of supervision and control relates directly to the 
requirements of EUREPGAP, and to maintaining both control over farming 
practices and securing the integrity of the QMS system, as described in Section
4.2. In the case of Exporter 3 (one of the companies with a well-organised 
outgrower scheme), the TA in the field visits farmers in an outgrower scheme
approximately once every two days, inspecting pesticide stores and pesticide 
protection equipment, filling in records for each farmer and filling in data sheets
that are sent to the company’s outgrower office. If the crop is being picked, the TA
checks to see that the crop pickers are trained and are wearing their headgear
and have washed their hands. The TA also has regular meetings with farmers to
talk about the problems they are experiencing and to reinforce messages about
the importance of compliance.
This level of control was then backed up by the internal audit system. Auditors
visit each farmer group and check the records, which will include records about
scouting (checking crops for problems), irrigation, fertiliser instructions, output, etc.
These are checked for consistency and matched with chemical stores and 
quantities and production for each block (part of a field). The auditor then 
produces an action plan. In one farmer group supplying Exporter 3, the TA
confirmed that the previous audit had produced a plan of 50 actions, which then
had to be carried out and later checked (Exporter 3, Respondent 4).
There is the possibility that such costs will make the export vegetable business
uncompetitive. It should not reduce Kenya’s advantage relative to other countries
that introduce Option 2 (if exporters are right, they are better placed than Kenya’s
competitors to introduce and work with this system), but if the costs are heavy and
they are not reflected in increased prices to buyers, then the adjustment process
in the industry could be painful. This process is unlikely to be one of buyers and
suppliers sitting down and deciding whether prices are reasonable in the light of
the new costs associated with EUREPGAP. Rather, exporters will be forced in the
short term to absorb the extra costs and the adjustment will come, if at all, as 
suppliers exit the market and supply starts to fail.
Of greater concern for the donors interested in the survival of small farmer export
horticulture in Kenya is the fact that these costs differ between small and large
farms. This could lead to a shift in sourcing within Kenya, or from countries that
use smallholders to countries that do not. 
6.2.3 The relative competitiveness of smallholder production
As was highlighted in Section 6.1, Mithöfer et al. (2007: 5) reported substantial 
differences in the time spent on monitoring for farmer groups and large contract
farmers. The former required 3.5 hours of supervision per week per acre, 
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compared to only 0.1 hours per week for the latter. This must have undermined
the cost advantage that small farmers are generally held to possess. The 
preceding sections also highlighted some of the control costs involved in 
operating Option 2. 
In this context, the key decision for exporters is whether to continue working with
small farmers or switch production to other types of producers (assuming that they
do not stop exporting products hitherto sourced from small farmers altogether).
The decisive factor in these decisions is not the percentage increase in pre-
farmgate costs for small farmers, but rather the relative cost of production by
smallholders compared to other forms of production.40
There was certainly potential for this problem to arise. In some cases, exporters
have shifted production to large contract farms. Exporter 5 had done this, citing
not only the costs of EUREPGAP, but also continuing problems with side selling
(which becomes more problematic with EUREPGAP, as described above).
Exporter 4 had drastically reduced sourcing from small farmers, citing side-selling,
but really indicating that because of the increasing cost and complexity of
EUREPGAP, the problem of ‘disloyalty’ (as seen from the exporter’s perspective)
had made sustaining the outgrower relationship unattractive.
Nevertheless, switching to large contract farmers is far from easy. This extensive
quote from a taped interview with one of the service providers indicates clearly
that access to land remains an issue:
One company, when this [EUREPGAP] first came along said, ‘We must bring
more supplies on board through our own farms. They’re easier to get
EUREPGAP’ed, we’re in control, we’re less likely to get pesticide residue, and
we can control the traceability and control the quality management system – if
they’re our farms and managed by us.’ But they suddenly realised that they
could not get the volume that way. So they then said, ‘Let’s look for out-
growers, but let’s look for large outgrowers who we can assist in getting
EUREPGAP’ed.’ And so they went through that process. But there are a 
limited number of large outgrowers that they can find. So, then they’ve 
decided that they still can’t get the volume, so they are now moving back to
the small-scale outgrowers. But whether they’re quite the same small-scale
outgrowers is not clear. Maybe they’re trying to reorganise the small-scale
outgrowers into more viable groups, or more viable units in terms of size and
location.’
(Service Provider 1)
What this may imply, and it has been suggested by others, is that there will be a
switch towards the larger end of the small-scale outgrowers. In other words, there
is a shift in outgrower strategy occurring, but it is more about what types of small
farmers might be included in Option 2, rather than abandoning such farmers 
altogether. It might also be the case that outgrowers will be easier to manage for
the production of tree crops, such as passion fruit, where the cycle of production
is much lower and the control challenges rather less.
40 The option of outsourcing small farmer production will be discussed below.
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The issue of land availability, however, has one further implication. It is not 
possible to generalise across countries about the impact of EUREPGAP on small
farmers. The risk of small farmer exclusion is much greater in countries where
there is land available for large farmers to use than in countries where land 
availability is restricted. Although this issue has been well understood in general
considerations of supermarket sourcing strategies (see, for example, Swinnen
2005; Humphrey 2007), it has not been raised in the literature on EUREPGAP.
6.3 Further initiatives
While donors worked to facilitate the entry of small farmers into export value
chains, the exporters themselves were also seeking to make EUREPGAP viable.
Here, more attention was paid to reducing the recurrent cost of managing the
EUREPGAP system rather than the start-up costs. As was argued above, Section
5.4 shows that 80 per cent of these costs were born by the exporters and no 
contribution was made by donors. Exporters were forced to make considerable
investments in management and monitoring, even when they had established 
outgrower schemes in place. 
Exporters needed to reduce these costs. Donors, too, recognised the need to
reduce the costs of compliance more generally. Separately and together, they
devised at least four ways to reduce their costs.
6.3.1 Modifying EUREPGAP
The first set of initiatives to reduce the costs of compliance with EUREPGAP
related to changing the impact of the standard itself. The major initiative was to
KenyaGAP as a national equivalent standard benchmarked to EUREPGAP. The
goal was to create a variant, but benchmarked, standard that would be more in
tune with local agronomic conditions and the organisational structure of local 
production. An example of the latter, widely cited in the industry in Kenya, was the
acceptance by Nigel Garbutt, Chairman of EUREPGAP, of water containers with a
tap underneath for hand washing in the field as meeting the ‘running water’
requirement in the standard. The creation of the National Technical Working
Group for KenyaGAP, led by the exports association, FPEAK, was supported by
donors directly41 and also through their support for participating organisations.
The initiative to develop a national scheme in Kenya is discussed in some detail
by Nyagah (2007).
EUREPGAP as an organisation supports these initiatives. It has a scheme to
benchmark national GAPs to EUREPGAP, which was outlined by Kylie Sheehan
of JAS-ANZ, one of the two bodies used by EUREPGAP for scheme bench-
marking, at the September 2007 GLOBALGAP conference (Sheehan 2007). 
41 DFID and USAID are cited by EUREPGAP as providing technical support for the National Technical 
Working Group.
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The donors also made representations to EUREPGAP. One plan of action 
developed by a leading donor agency in Kenya highlighted the need to lobby the
EUREPGAP Secretariat in order to reduce the costs of the testing of soil and
water samples, and for a reduction of the frequency of testing for pesticide residue
levels. More specifically on the challenges facing small farmers, GLOBALGAP,
DFID and GTZ have supported the creation of a mechanism to support the 
articulation of small farmer concerns within GLOBALGAP, as described by Kern
(2008). The Africa-Observer initiative is characterised as an ‘Ambassador for
Smallholders in Developing Countries’, whose role is to link small farmer interests
and initiatives to the GLOBALGAP sectoral committees.
6.3.2 Reworking Certification Body audits
A second strategy adopted by exporters has been to try to reduce the costs of
certification by taking on more responsibility for control. This strategy was 
undertaken at Exporter 2, with the support of Donor 2.42 Working with the 
certifying body (from outside of Kenya), Exporter 2 has developed a QMS system
that shifts the burden of auditing from the certifier to the exporter. According to the
head of the outgrower programme at Exporter 2, this meant that the certifying
focused more on the exporter’s internal audit system, rather than on the 
outgrower groups themselves. According to Exporter 2 and Exporter 3, the same
model had been adopted by Exporter 3.
6.3.3 Certifying farmer groups as fields or a single farm
This is an initiative which has been widely discussed in Kenya. There is an 
extensive discussion in Graffham et al. (2007). It was developed by one of the
donors in conjunction with one of the larger exporters as a means of reducing the
cost of certification for the growers. As was discussed above, each of the 
outgrowers in a scheme is classified as a field on a single ‘farm’. If all the farmers
in the group take water from a common source, then the levels of soil and water
testing are reduced to those of a single farm. This is a substantial cost saving. At
the same time, there is no obligation to develop the QMS required for Option 2,
which is another substantial cost saving. However, for these farmers to be 
considered as a single farm, then not only does the whole unit have to be under a
centralised management, but legal ownership of the product has also to be held
by the central management unit. In effect, the individual farmer within the group
becomes a combination of employee of the group and lessee of land to it. 
At first, this model was considered controversial in Kenya. It was not considered
to be compliant with EUREPGAP, and it was not clear whether the ownership of
the product and the degree of management control that would be expected on a
single farm could be recreated within a farmer group. Nevertheless, in spite of this
controversy, the legitimacy of the scheme does not appear to have been 
challenged by the EUREPGAP Secretariat. If applied properly, however, this
42 Exporter 2 also stated that a similar programme had been developed by Exporter 3.
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model does greatly curtail farmer input into the farming system. This approach to
certification may have been unanticipated, but it is not necessarily unallowable.
6.3.4 Outsourcing management: the Vertical Marketing Organization
(VMO)
One of the insights of value chain analysis is that the set of activities that are
required to bring a product to market can be bundled and split in a number of
ways. This is reflected in outsourcing, for example, where activities previously
undertaken within an enterprise are placed outside it. It is also possible to transfer
co-located activities from one legally independent agent to another. For example,
one way in which Kenyan exporters responded to increasingly stringent rules on
pesticide residues in the 1990s was to transfer responsibility for pesticide spraying
from outgrowers to staff employed by the exporter. In the discussion above on the
cost of monitoring, the transfer of activities such as scouting for crop problems
and decisions about what pesticides to use from the farmer to the exporter, or to
specialised workers (who might be self-employed or employed by specialist 
companies) was also described.
A more drastic adoption of this principle has been the outsourcing by some
exporters of the whole management of outgrower schemes. The best-documented
example of this in Kenya has been the creation of a PMO called FreshLink. Kevin
Billing, working for the BSMDP programme which supported FreshLink, 
summarises the company as:
a former broker transforming into a registered company providing area based
services such as input supply, credit, scouting, spraying, production advice
and record keeping. S&S helped develop and implement a EUREPGAP
quality management system (QMS) for the nine loose groups working with the
service provider – FreshLink.
(Billing 2006: 18) 
FreshLink provides, therefore, services to farmers, including the development and
implementation of a QMS. According to a presentation by Amos Waweru, a 
consultant whose company was used to develop the FreshLink model and its
QMS system, FreshLink provides services to farmers and farmer groups and
finances this through charging a commission on the produce that they sell
(Waweru 2006: 26–7). The role of FreshLink includes:
l Farmer groups formation and development.
l Provision of technical advice, including company agronomists, spraying teams
and technical assistants working with farmers.
l Facilitation of the construction of facilities such as collection centres, central 
management unit, spraying services, etc, needed by farmer groups.
l Marketing a farmer groups’ horticultural produce, both through logistics 
(bulking and transportation of produce from farms to markets) and arranging 
contracts with exporters.
l Arranging farm input supply at lower costs.
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In other words, FreshLink is an intermediary, facilitating body, operating between
the farmer groups and the exporters. This status is confirmed by the contractual
relationships. FreshLink has a contractual relationship with the farmer groups
‘which stipulates the terms and conditions of their relationship including payments,
produce delivery and commission charged. [Each farmer group] is expected to
implement and observe all service provider’s policies and procedures and to
ensure that its member farmers comply with the contractual obligations’ (Waweru
2006: 28). It does not have a contractual relationship with exporters, and it does
not take ownership of the product. It brokers the relationship. Similarly, it does not
have a contractual relationship with individual farmers, but only the farmer group,
which is itself a legal entity. 
In principle, this model could overcome the problem of donors directly supporting
large exporters because FreshLink can supply multiple exporters – in 2006, it
claimed to be facilitating access of farmers to four different exporters. At the same
time, the service provision to farmers is de-linked from the exporters, and no
direct payments are made to them by donors. If this model were developed on an
area-wide basis as suggested by Billing, then it might also facilitate area-wide
testing of water and soil quality.
Nevertheless, the model does contain some transactional risks. For the farmers, it
offers the possibility of supplying various exporters, and not being tied into the 
fortunes and strategies of a particular exporter. Conversely, it also means that no
particular exporter is committed to these farmers. For the exporters, it also offers
flexibility and the possibility of working with multiple farmer groups without the
costs of running an outgrowers scheme. But, there is also a downside for the
exporters. With this system, there is no assured supply for exporters. Should there
be an overall shortage of produce, each exporter would be competing against
other exporters for product.
The scheme is also open to control and financial risks. It clearly depends on the
extent to which the VMO is able to monitor and control the farmer groups, and the
capacity of these groups to exercise control over their members. It was argued
above that maintaining the integrity of the EUREPGAP system required constant
supervision and control. It is not clear where this control will come from. It seems
to reside in the farmer group as an entity, and its potential loss of contracts should
it be unable to maintain control over its members and implement the advice 
provided by the VMO. Financially, this control has to be exercised within the cost
constraint imposed by the level of commission that it is able to charge (once the
donor subsidy expires). In this respect, the VMO is open to the usual risks of 
outgrower schemes, such as side-selling, and the more that it develops its control
system, the more commission will rise and the more there will be a temptation to
side sell.
What the FreshLink VMO model does show, however, is the capacity of firms in
value chains to innovate in response to new challenges by bundling and splitting
activities and creating new companies. This particular model does not seem to
have succeeded, and part of the reason for this seems to have been a withdrawal
of donor support at this stage before the project became viable. The success or
failure of a single company will not provide definitive evidence on this point 
anyway. It does, however, point to the potential for service provider development
to open up new opportunities for small farmers to access complex markets. 
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6.4 Was there any case for donor support for integrating small
farmers into EUREPGAP value chains? 
Kenyan horticulture is probably one of the most studied parts of developing 
country agriculture. Exporters in Kenya frequently remarked that their ‘real’
production is matched by an equally large production of paper. The latter is 
needed for conforming to the demands of the many different standards they are
expected to follow. The paper produced by analysts of Kenyan horticulture 
probably comes a close second to this standards paper trail. The bibliography on
Kenyan horticulture is vast. 
In spite of this, it is still not possible to say whether or not donors should have
supported small farm certification, or what were the consequences of the support
that was given. The recent studies summarised in Section 6.1 are not consistent,
and they are not conclusive. We know that:
l Specific exporters did receive funds that reduce the costs of introducing 
management systems for outgrower schemes and obtaining certification for 
farmer groups.
l Donors supported a range of initiatives directed at creating service providers 
who could support a range of horticulture sector factors to meet the demands 
of EUREPGAP.
l Some small farmers who had been working in exporter-managed outgrower 
schemes prior to 2005 were no longer working in these schemes in 2006–07.
These three facts do not tell us very much about the efficacy of donor interve-
tions. First, exporters were willing to take donor funds when they were offered and
use them for a range of initiatives related to outgrowers. There is, however, very
little evidence about the additionality of this funding. In some cases, exporters
freely admitted that they would have ensured the continued operation of their 
outgrower schemes irrespective of donor funding because they needed this
source of supply to meet the demands of their customers. But it is impossible to
say just how much of donor funding failed the additionality test. Second, there
seems, as yet, to be little clear evidence about the effectiveness of service
providers: the service providers are not always sustainable beyond the period of
donor support. Third, the evidence that some outgrower schemes were cut back
or discontinued does not establish that EUREPGAP led directly to the exclusion of
small farmers from horticultural value chains. Small farmer participation in such
chains in Kenya does have a cyclical element to it, and there have been 
disagreements in the past about both levels of participation and trends. At the
same time, the rundown of some outgrower schemes could be compatible with
the growth of others. Anecdotal evidence from Kenya seems to indicate that up to
the end of 2007 the small farmer horticulture sector continued to thrive, as did the
export horticulture business as a whole. All this uncertainty might appear to justify
more research, but a clear reason for better understanding what is going on in
Kenyan horticulture would have to be established first.
What is clear, however, is that, at the very least, the cost advantage of small 
farmers in horticultural production is undermined by EUREPGAP. Furthermore, the
extra costs to small farmers (relative to large farmers) arising from EUREPGAP
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are ongoing costs. They relate not only to the start-up costs of investing in 
equipment and systems, but also to the continuing costs of monitoring and 
control. It is also clear that in Kenya, and possibly most of Africa, independent
small farmer groups have little or no chance of meeting EUREPGAP
requirements, and that the role of processors and exporters is crucial in creating
and sustaining EUREPGAP-compliant production systems. This means that donor
activities in relation to EUREPGAP must recognise the dynamics of horticultural
value chains and find ways of working effectively with the private sector firms that
play an important role in them.
7 Conclusions
Food standards are ever more important in the global economy. Private voluntary
standards relating to food safety such as EUREPGAP may be invisible to the 
consumer, but they have direct impact on farmers in both developed and 
developing countries. They pose a particular challenge to small farmers because
of the complexity of their compliance requirements. 
The study of the impact of EUREPGAP in Kenya had two main objectives:
1. To investigate the interaction between public and private standards for agri-
food products in the context of global value chains. The paper focused on the 
issue of value chain governance and how public food safety standards are 
simultaneously a part of this governance and also a source of new coor-
dination requirements in value chains. It identified trends in global standards 
and explored the linkages between public and private standards. This 
analysis was informed by the global value chain approach, used in earlier 
analyses of Kenyan horticulture (Dolan and Humphrey 2000, 2004).
2. To understand the effect ‘on the ground’ in Kenya of developments in global 
standard-setting and to analyse the response of donors to the perceived 
challenge of EUREPGAP to the continued inclusion of small farmers in horti
cultural export value chains. It asked whether or not the many donor inter-
ventions that were designed to alleviate or offset these consequences were 
adequately designed and whether or not the donors understood how 
EUREPGAP operated in the context of highly-organised horticultural value 
chains. 
7.1 Public and private standards
By placing EUREPGAP in the context of general trends in food safety standards,
and in particular changes in EU legislation around standards, it was possible to
identify key drivers for private standards-setting and their consequences for the
organisation of agri-food value chains:
1. Two contrasting motivations for the development of private standards and 
their consequences for private standard-setting were identified. Private 
voluntary standards created by groups of firms or industry associations are 
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predominantly driven by the needs of companies to control reputational risk 
and achieve conformance with external expectations about standards 
compliance. These expectations are predominantly driven by public 
standards, although NGOs and other bodies may also raise issues that affect 
company reputations. 
2. EUREPGAP is a good example of a private voluntary standard created 
(initially) by retailers in response to the increasing range and strictness of 
public food safety standards and the reputational risks arising from the 
increased emphasis on food business operator responsibility for food safety in
the context of consumer concerns about food safety. In other words, collective
private standards and public standards are closely intertwined.
3. It follows that the development of private standards is an issue for the EU. In 
particular, it has to be acknowledged that private standards are important 
elements of nontariff barriers to food exports from developing countries. This 
then has consequences for policy coherence. In effect, a number of EU 
governments were spending development aid to offset one of the 
consequences of their food safety policy.
4. As EU regulations relating to food safety become more complex, so the 
coordination challenges for food business operators increase. They are 
expected to ensure food safety by exercising control over the value chain, but
these value chains are becoming more complex as a result of globalisation.
5. An increasing reliance on private voluntary standards backed up by third-party
certification is one way of reducing the cost of coordination and control or 
shifting these costs along the value chain (or both). Private voluntary 
standards are designed to reduce the risks of non-compliance and transfer 
some of the burdens of compliance up the value chain towards producers and
exporters. 
6. The standards have different consequences for coordination challenges at 
different points in the value chain. In principle, they simplify the coordination 
challenge for retailers and exporters because they codify the procedures 
needed to ensure compliance with public standards and use certification as a 
means of enforcing and indicating this compliance. In practice, the pressure 
on importers remains high because no certification system is perfect and 
importers perceived the consequences of failure as extremely high for them. 
7. For exporters and producers, private voluntary standards and third-party 
certification make the coordination challenge more complex, and in particular 
it becomes more complex when small farmers are incorporated into the value 
chain. The EUREPGAP standard requires internal audit and the development 
and continued implementation of control systems at farm level. Therefore, its 
impact on horticulture outgrower schemes is to increase coordination and 
monitoring requirements (and hence costs) and to put a premium on small 
farmer capabilities. 
8. Small farmer compliance with EUREPGAP without outgrower schemes (either
administered directly by exporters, or through independent PMOs) is almost 
inconceivable. Whether or not this leads to the large-scale exclusion of small 
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farmers from the horticultural value chains that require EUREPGAP is an 
open question. It depends not so much on the costs of compliance, but on the
impact the standard has on the relative costs of small and large farm 
production and on the availability of land for large-scale farming. 
Nevertheless, even if small farmers continue to be used by exporters, there 
will be a tendency towards using the larger small farmers and the more 
educated and capable small farmers. 
9. It should be noted that the problems highlighted in the study of fruit and 
vegetables are relatively mild compared to those encountered for food of 
animal origin, such as meat, dairy products and seafood. Here, the complexity
of the standards environment is much greater. The draft GLOBALGAP
standard for shrimp43 is much more complicated than that for fruit and 
vegetables.
7.2 The donor response
Did the donors understand the nature of the challenge presented by EUREPGAP?
The answer is ‘no’, and they were not alone in this. The full ramifications of
EUREPGAP were not easy to see at the time. Nevertheless, it is important to
highlight the shortcomings in analysis and assumptions that underlined the donor
interventions.
10. The donors had a strong motivation to respond to the perceived challenge of 
EUREPGAP. Export horticulture was seen as a success story in Kenya that 
combined agricultural dynamism, the capacity to compete in the most 
demanding of global markets, inclusion of small farmers and the creation of 
substantial urban and peri-urban employment in post-harvest processing. It 
combined a vibrant private sector with the promotion of improved incomes for 
some small farmers.
11. There was some ambivalence in the donor response, but this ambivalence is 
typical of the donor interventions more generally. On the one hand, there is a 
business case for promoting competitive horticulture that has to remain 
successful in a complex and dynamic global market. On the other hand, the 
underlying motivation for promoting this business is the reduction of poverty in
the context of the donor priority for achieving MDG 1, halving the number of 
people living on less than $1-a-day by 2015. Managing these potentially 
conflicting goals requires a clear understanding and redefinition of the role of 
the public and private sectors.44
12. The effectiveness of the donor response was certainly compromised by the 
sense of urgency that descended on Kenya in late 2004. Understanding how 
to intervene in what was a complex system of production does take time. 
Furthermore, the sense of urgency seems to have created a misguided sense
43 See www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=9&idart=298.
44 I am grateful to Heike Höffler of GTZ for making this point to me.
IDS WORKING PAPER 308
79
that EUREPGAP and certification was a sufficient condition for access to key 
parts of the European market, rather than merely a necessary condition. It 
generated the perverse effect of encouraging more money to be spent on 
supporting smallholder inclusion in the European market, and in particular the 
EUREPGAP certified market, just at a time when the barriers to this inclusion 
were increasing. Overall, it is clear that EUREPGAP does not provide major 
new opportunities for small farmers. At best, donor interventions were not 
likely to do anything more than maintain existing levels of smallholder 
involvement in EUREPGAP-certified value chains.
13. With the rush to ‘do something’, the donors also failed to ask a fundamental 
question about small farmer export horticulture in Kenya. Is it worth promoting
on poverty reduction grounds? Earlier work by McCulloch and Ota (2002) 
concluded that export horticulture by smallholders and on large farms were 
equally poverty reducing. Recent work by Maertens and Swinnen (2006) on 
Senegal comes to the same conclusion. These conclusions should inform 
future policy in this area. With respect to EUREPGAP, it is possibly the case 
that small farmers have more scope for involvement in export value chains for
tree crops such as passion fruit rather than fresh vegetables.
14. When developing programmes for supporting small farmers, the donors do 
not appear to have understood the central issue of quality assurance system 
integrity, and hence control. In various instances, it seemed to be the case 
that the donors regarded training as the major issue. Clearly, farmers have to 
understand what EUREPGAP is about,45 but they certainly do not need to 
ever see the standard as it is codified. Translating EUREPGAP documents 
would be futile. These documents define the performance characteristics of 
the quality system. They then have to be translated into particular procedures 
for different agents operating within that system. Conversely, the critical but 
under-emphasised challenge is developing a reliable and cost-effective 
control system. The data from Mithöfer et al. (2007) on the time spent per ha. 
per week on supervision is particularly telling.
15. The central role of the exporters in the process was not immediately 
appreciated, although some donors did perceive this and involve exporters 
more actively in later interventions. The basic point is that EUREPGAP is a 
standard that is only required by a small group of powerful supermarkets in 
Europe. The supermarkets source their produce overwhelmingly through a 
limited number of medium and large exporters. Given the role of these 
exporters as the gateway to the only customers that required EUREPGAP,
their role was central. Smallholders working for these exporters would 
necessarily need EUREPGAP certification. If smallholders not working to 
these exporters sought certification, they would run the risk of incurring 
additional costs without any immediate offsetting benefits.46
45 Although what they need to understand, and how much, is a moot issue. They certainly need to know 
something about operating the system on a day-to-day level, even though various parts of quality 
system operation would be transferred to specialist technical staff. It might be argued that a good 
understanding of the general principles of quality management would be important to ensure 
motivation and continued commitment to following procedures. 
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16. A potential further problem also arose for donors from the value chain 
coordination challenges of EUREPGAP. The biggest challenge is maintaining 
the integrity of the food safety system. This implies that the ongoing costs of 
monitoring and control could be particularly high for small farmers, as 
suggested above. This in turn could imply that donor support would be 
needed for small farmers’ recurrent costs, as well as the start-up costs that 
the donors were particularly willing to support. However ongoing monitoring 
and control costs were identified by exporters as part of their overall business 
costs, and were predominantly paid by the exporters themselves. Therefore, 
the issue of recurrent costs did not arise as a problem. 
17. Greater appreciation of EUREPGAP as a value chain challenge would also 
have enabled donors to appreciate the ways in which different functions 
relating to production and the standard system can be transferred between 
different actors along the chain. One can then produce strategies for trans-
ferring to other actors (specialist crop sprayers, picking teams, technical 
assistants) those tasks which may be particularly problematic for small 
farmers.
18. The misunderstanding of the critical role of the exporters leads to short-
comings in the analysis. As was argued in Section 6.2, the real issue is not 
the cost for farmers of achieving EUREPGAP certification from scratch, but 
the way in which variations in the costs of certification change the relative 
competitiveness of Kenyan producers versus other producers and small 
farmers in Kenya versus large farmers. This is evident in two perceived 
outcomes of EUREPGAP. First, as Graffham et al. (2007) point out, the 
recurrent costs of EUREPGAP were largely paid by the exporters. Second, 
there is some suggestion that the exporters that have well-organised 
outgrower schemes were more likely to stick with them, while the exporters 
which had relied on looser relations with suppliers were likely to switch to 
either intermediaries such as FreshLink or larger-scale farmers. The start-up 
costs for EUREPGAP would be greater for exporters which did not have good
systems in place.
19. Finally, it should be noted that the export horticulture sector in Kenya is very 
much the exception in Africa. It consists of a number of very efficient firms 
that have sophisticated production and processing operations and strong 
linkages to export markets. In many other African countries, the export sector 
is much weaker. It follows that any lessons that one might wish to draw from 
Kenya may not apply to many other African countries. Promoting exports of 
high-value products in countries where the existing export sector is weak or 
non-existent is a completely different challenge.
If one of the lessons of donor interventions around EUREPGAP is that the 
business linkages involved in small farmer export production, and in particular the
role of exporters, need to be better understood and incorporated into donor policy,
46 While there are some agricultural benefits from following the good agricultural practice principles in 
EUREPGAP, they would be very unlikely to increase efficiency and productivity sufficiently to increase 
overall income for farmers.
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how this should be done is far from clear. Some donors, but not all, still have 
difficulties in working with the private sector. There is some reluctance to get
involved with large farmers and exporters. The poverty pay offs seems to be too
small or too indirect. There is a genuine problem. It is far from clear that support
for exporters created much additionality. A number of exporters indicated that they
were happy to receive funding from the donors, but that it did not necessarily
change their strategies with respect to small farmers.
Working with the private sector does not, however, necessarily mean working with
a small group of large exporters. Some donors adopted policies designed to
enhance service provision and hence develop a supportive market environment
that would be open to multiple private sector actors. These could be considered
part of a broader strategy of ‘making markets work for the poor’. Six examples of
such interventions were listed in Table 5.1. It is too early to say whether these
interventions will be effective. The challenges of ensuring sustainability beyond
the life of the donor interventions are well-known, and it is too early to conclude
anything about the effectiveness. 
Food safety and private voluntary standards will not disappear. All the tendencies
in global food production are moving in the direction of increasing safety concerns
in the context of increasingly complex global value chains, with more actors and
increasing geographical dispersion. Therefore, the challenge for donors will be
both to understand better how the global food businesses are organised into value
chains that link together dispersed economic agents, and to devise policies and
programmes that recognise the possible trade-offs between business vitality and
poverty reduction and identify the roles and responsibilities of public and private
actors in ways that allow these trade-offs to be overcome.
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Appendix 1 Sources for study
This study was predominantly conducted through lengthy interviews with key
respondents. Many of these respondents requested anonymity. The following 
categories of people were interviewed:
Exporters
Eleven respondents from six different exporters in Kenya. These respondents
included company directors, outgrower managers and technical assistants. Two
further respondents from one of the exporting companies were interviewed in the
UK. 
Donors
Nine different donor respondents were interviewed, mostly, but not entirely, in
Kenya. These respondents included donor staff, people employed by companies
contracted by donors to implement programmes and some consultants hired for
this implementation. 
Service providers
A third category of interviewees can be categorised generically as ‘service
providers’. These included specialist companies providing services relating to 
certification, local NGOs and one independent produce marketing organisation.
Six respondents from service providers were interviewed. In addition, 10 farmers
working for the independent PMO were interviewed. The Chairman of 
GLOBALG.A.P., Nigel Garbutt, was also interviewed.
Internet
In addition, it should be noted that the internet is an increasingly important source
for materials. Donors and local institutions put an increasingly large amount of
material on the web. The extent of this material and its use was indicated clearly
by Table 5.1. Such material is not always easy to find. In a number of instances,
the key informant interviews provided the information needed to refine internet
searches so that the most useful materials were obtained. In addition to 
information on donor initiatives, many food standards are documented on the
web. GLOBALG.A.P. as an organisation has particularly extensive documentation
of its standards, procedures and activities. Other standards also provide good
indications of objectives and approaches. It was possible to find out a lot about
donor programmes and projects in Kenya by exploring the web. Interviews often
provided the basis for knowing what to search for. All of this material provides
much more extensive resources than would have been available even five years
ago.
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